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Abstract
THREE ESSAYS ON GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
David R. Christafore
This dissertation consists of three essays that provide empirical evidence that informs the
ongoing debate over the passage of gay and lesbian rights legislation. In Chapter 2 the
difference-in-difference-in-difference methodology is used to examine the effect that the pas-
sage of a private employment anti-discrimination law has on the relative earnings and em-
ployment of gays and lesbians. The results of this analysis indicate that the passage of this
law does not have an impact on either relative earnings or employment for lesbians, but it
does have an impact on these labor market outcomes for gays. In particular, the passage
of this anti-discrimination law increases the relative earnings for gays by 7.5% and reduces
their relative probability of being employed by 2.4%. In Chapter 3 a gravity model of state-
to-state gay and lesbian migration flows over the period 1995-2000 is estimated in order
to analyze the revealed preferences of gays and lesbians for private and public employment
anti-discrimination, hate crime, and domestic partnership laws. The results of this exami-
nation indicate that private employment anti-discrimination laws reduce in-migration, while
public employment anti-discrimination and hate crime laws increase in-migration. There-
fore, it appears that gays and lesbians prefer to live in places with public employment
anti-discrimination and hate crime laws, and not in places with private employment anti-
discrimination laws. In Chapter 4 a spatial hedonic autoregressive model is estimated for
the Columbus, OH MSA to examine the impact that the percentage of gay and lesbian
households in conservative and liberal neighborhoods has on the house prices in those neigh-
borhoods. The results of the analysis indicate that a .1% point increase in the percentage
of gay and lesbian households increases house prices in liberal neighborhoods by .81% and
reduces house prices by .24% in conservative neighborhoods. Thus, evidence is provided that
is consistent with gay and lesbian households being an amenity to liberal neighborhoods, but
a disamenity, likely due to prejudice, to conservative neighborhoods.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The passage of various types of gay and lesbian rights legislation has been a topic of heated
debate in recent years. Despite this debate, there has not been much attention paid to issues
surrounding the passage of such legislation in the economics literature. This lack of attention
is unfortunate since the passage, or non-passage, of gay and lesbian rights legislation can
have important impacts on the lives of gays and lesbians. The following three chapters of
this dissertation provide empirical evidence that fills this void in the economics literature.
The data set of gays and lesbians that is used in the following three chapters is from
the 5% PUMS of the 1990 and 2000 editions of the U.S. Census. Starting with the 1990
Census, individuals have been able to identify themselves as unmarried partners to the head
of the household that they live in. Therefore, gay and lesbian couples can be identified
from the Census as those unmarried partners that are of the same sex. Since there is no
explicit question asking for a person’s sexual orientation, single gays and lesbians cannot be
identified and are not a part of this analysis. The reliability of this data set of gay and lesbian
unmarried partners has been analyzed in detail by Carpenter (2004) and Black et al. (2000).
They both conclude that the Census sample of gay and lesbian couples is representative of
gay and lesbian couples in the population and therefore a reliable source of data on these
individuals.
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Chapter 2 analyzes the effect that the passage of state laws from 1990-1998 that prohib-
ited private sector labor market discrimination based on a person’s sexual orientation had on
the relative earnings and employment of gays and lesbians. The motivation for this chapter
is that it is not clear a priori if the passage of a sexual orientation anti-discrimination law
leads to an improvement or decline in the labor market outcomes of gays and lesbians. The
reason for this ambiguity is that the passage of this law increases a firm’s expected cost
of not hiring gays and lesbians by allowing these individuals to file lawsuits over perceived
discrimination in hiring, while at the same time it increases a firm’s expected cost of hiring
gays and lesbians by allowing these individuals to file lawsuits over perceived discrimination
in firing.
The only previous paper to date to analyze the effect of sexual orientation anti-discrimination
laws is Klawitter and Flatt (1998), which uses a cross-sectional analysis and focuses mainly
on the effect of these laws on gay and lesbian relative earnings. The analysis in Chapter
2 departs from Klawitter and Flatt (1998) in that it adopts the difference-in-difference-in-
difference methodology that has been commonly used to study the effects that sex (Neumark
and Stock, 2001), race (Neumark and Stock, 2001; Collins, 2003), and disability (Beegle and
Stock, 2003) anti-discrimination laws have had on protected groups. This methodology
provides a more accurate estimate of the effect of the passage of a sexual orientation anti-
discrimination law since it allows for pre-law differences in relative earnings and employment
between gays and lesbians in states that did and did not pass a law to be controlled for.
The results of the analysis suggest that the passage of a sexual orientation anti-discrimination
law does not have an effect on the relative earnings or employment of lesbians, but it does
have impact on labor market outcomes for gays. These results also indicate that the impact
on gays depends on age. In particular, the passage of a sexual orientation anti-discrimination
law increases the relative earnings of gays 19-64 years old by 7.5% and reduces the relative
probability of being employed by 2.4%. Separating the sample into a younger and older
group, the passage of this law increases the relative earnings of gays 19-39 years old by 8.6%,
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but it does not have an effect on the relative earnings of gays 40-64 years old. Also, it reduces
the relative probability of being employed for gays 40-64 years old by 4.5%, but it does not
have an impact on the relative probability of being employed for gays 19-39 years old.
Chapter 3 examines the preferences of gays and lesbians for sexual orientation private
and public employment anti-discrimination, hate crime, and domestic partnership laws. The
motivation for this chapter is that the existing evidence on the preferences of gays and les-
bians for particular legislation is inconclusive. Survey evidence shows that gays and lesbians
face a high rate of hate crimes (Herek, 2009), and econometric studies provide evidence that
gays (Elmslie and Tebaldi, 2007; Allegretto and Arthur, 2001) and lesbians (Badgett, 1995)
may face labor market discrimination. These studies seem to indicate that gays and lesbians
have a strong preference for gay and lesbian rights legislation. However, survey evidence
exists that provides evidence that gays and lesbians are not very informed on the existence
of state and national gay and lesbian rights legislation (Egan et al., 2008), which suggests
that this legislation may not be important to them.
This study is based on the theory, set forth by Tiebout (1956), that individuals reveal
their preferences for public sector policies through their location decisions. Following from
this theory, the choice of gays and lesbians to migrate in and out of states with and without
gay and lesbian rights legislation can be used to analyze their preferences for this legislation.
Therefore, a gravity model of state-to-state gay and lesbian migration flows over the period
1995-2000 is estimated. The gravity model is estimated using the spatial autoregressive
Tobit model in order to account for spatial dependence in the migration flows of the model
as well as the large number of zero migration flows of gays and lesbians that are observed.
The results from the estimation of this model provide evidence that gays and lesbians
do have a preference for certain types of gay and lesbian rights legislation. For one, it
is found that the inclusion of sexual orientation in hate crime laws and the existence of
public employment anti-discrimination legislation increases gay and lesbian in-migration to
a state. This finding indicates that gays and lesbians likely benefit from these two pieces
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of legislation. Additionally, the results indicate that the existence of private employment
anti-discrimination legislation actually reduces in-migration. This result, therefore, provides
evidence that gays and lesbians may be made worse off by this type of legislation, which is
a result that is consistent with the findings from Chapter 2, at least for gays, in regard to
the impact of private employment anti-discrimination laws.
Chapter 4 uses a revealed preferences approach to analyze the existence of prejudice
against gay and lesbian households. The motivation for this chapter is that individuals
opposing the passage of gay and lesbian rights anti-discrimination and hate crimes legislation
often do so making the claim that gays and lesbians aren’t discriminated against in society.
Therefore, the argument goes, this legislation just extends special privileges to gays and
lesbians. Also, arguments are made against allowing gays and lesbians to marry that make
the claim that this legislation would serve to ruin the institution of marriage and negatively
impact society. Despite these arguments, empirical evidence suggests that gays (Tebaldi and
Elmslie, 2006; Allegretto and Arthur, 2001) and lesbians (Badgett, 1995) face discrimination,
are subject to hate crimes (Herek, 2009), and gay and lesbian marriage does not negatively
impact society (Langbein and Yost Jr., 2009). Therefore, these arguments might be based
more on prejudice that is held against gays and lesbians rather than truth, which one would
think is not a valid reason to reject gay and lesbian rights legislation.
The methodology used to analyze the revealed preferences for gay and lesbian households
is based on the hedonic price model set forth by Rosen (1974). The hedonic price model
suggests that the price of a house represents the sum of expenditures on a number of bundled
housing characteristics, including house specific and neighborhood characteristics. Thus,
based on this model, an analysis of the implicit price the average household of a neighborhood
places on living in a neighborhood with more gay and lesbian households reveals their attitude
towards these households. The particular hedonic price model that is estimated in Chapter 4
is estimated using a spatial autoregressive model using data on year 2000 housing transactions
in the Columbus, OH MSA.
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The findings of Chapter 4 are consistent with the theory that gay and lesbian households
are an amenity to liberal neighborhoods that value diversity, yet a disamentiy to a conserva-
tive neighborhood that may hold prejudice against these households. It is found that a .1%
point increase in the percentage of gay and lesbian households in a neighborhood increases
house prices in a liberal neighborhood by .81%. However, in conservative neighborhoods a
.1% increase in the percentage of gay and lesbian households reduces house prices by .24%.
These results are generally robust to using housing data from the Cleveland, OH MSA, as
opposed to the Columbus, OH MSA, for the analysis.
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Chapter 2
An Analysis of the Impact of State
Anti-discrimination Laws on the
Relative Earnings and Employment of
Gays and Lesbians
1 Introduction
Gays and lesbians have struggled since the beginning of the 1970’s to have legislation passed
that prohibits labor market discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation (Rim-
merman et al., eds, 2000).1 Their efforts have had some success at the state level of gov-
ernment as 21 states and the District of Columbia have passed a sexual orientation anti-
discrimination law (from here on referred to as a SOA law) (Human Rights Campaign,
2009). This success has not carried over to the federal level of government where a SOA law
has yet to be passed.2 Despite the ongoing debate at the federal and state levels of govern-
1Anti-discrimination laws in this paper refer to those that specifically prohibit employment discrimination.
2The Employment Non Discrimination Act (ENDA) is a proposed bill in Congress that would create a
federal SOA law. It was first introduced by the 103rd Congress in 1994, and has been introduced by each
Congress since then except for the 109th. This proposed bill is currently in the Senate Health, Education,
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ment, there is not much evidence that exists on the impact of SOA laws on the earnings and
employment of gays and lesbians. This paper provides evidence on the impact of SOA laws
by utilizing the difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) methodology to examine the ef-
fect that the passage of state level SOA laws in the 1990’s had on the the relative earnings
and employment of gays and lesbians.
A SOA law gives gays and lesbians the ability to file a lawsuit against a firm if they believe
that they have been discriminated against in hiring, firing, or pay. Proponents of SOA laws
base their support on the belief that gays and lesbians are discriminated against in the labor
market (Badgett, 2001). The problem with proponents basing their support on this belief is
that even if discrimination exists against gays and lesbians, the passage of a SOA law does
not necessarily improve their relative earnings or employment. The reason for this is that the
passage of a SOA law may cause the firm to fear a costly lawsuit if it ever decides to fire gays
and lesbians after hiring them, resulting in decreased labor demand and worse labor market
outcomes for gays and lesbians. In fact, studies on the labor market impacts of disability
(Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Beegle and Stock, 2003) and sex (Neumark and Stock, 2001)
anti-discrimination laws provide evidence that the passage of anti-discrimination laws do not
always improve labor market outcomes.
To date, the only previous paper to investigate the effects of SOA laws has been Klawitter
and Flatt (1998). Their paper uses a cross-sectional analysis to analyze the effect of SOA
laws on the relative earnings of gays and lesbians. This paper differs from their paper in
that it uses the DDD methodology instead of cross-sectional analysis. The advantage of the
DDD methodology is that it allows for differences between gays and lesbians prior to the
passage of a SOA law in the states that did and did not pass a SOA law to be controlled for.
Controlling for the pre-law differences between these two different groups of gays and lesbians
could be important if the passage of SOA laws is correlated with unobservable productivity
differences. This paper also contributes to the literature by being the first to examine the
Labor, and Pensions Committee (The Library of Congress, 2009).
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impact that the passage of a SOA law has on gay and lesbian employment.
The DDD methodology can be used to analyze the impact of SOA laws since these laws
are passed in eight states between the years 1990 and 1998. The results of the DDD analysis
suggest that the passage of a SOA law does not have an effect on the relative earnings or
employment of lesbians, but it does have impact on labor market outcomes for gays. In
particular, the passage of a SOA law increases the relative earnings of gays 19-39 years old
by 8.6%, but it does not have an effect on the relative earnings of gays 40-64 years old.
Additionally, the passage of a SOA law reduces the relative probability of being employed
for gays 40-64 years old by 4.5%, but it does not have an impact on the relative probability
of being employed for gays 19-39 years old.
2 Literature Review
A number of previous papers have examined the effect of the passage of the federal racial anti-
discrimination law using time-series analysis. Heckman (1990) reviews this literature and
concludes that the federal anti-discrimination law improved the economic progress of blacks.
The main problem in a time-series analysis of the effect of a federal anti-discrimination law is
that it is difficult to determine if the estimated change in the outcome of a particular group
is due to the passage of the law or a continuation of a trend for that group that existed
prior to the passage of the law. In order to overcome this problem it is necessary to identify
individuals of the group that did not experience the passage of the legislation (a “control
group”), as well as individuals of the group that did experience the passage of the legislation
(a “treatment group”). The identification of these groups is difficult, however, when dealing
with federal laws that are mostly universal in their coverage.
Cross-sectional analysis has been applied to looking at the effect of state level laws,
which allows for a control group to be identified, but a problem still arises in that differences
between the control and treatment groups prior to the passage of the law cannot be identified.
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Cross-sectional analysis is utilized by Klawitter and Flatt (1998) to investigate the effect that
SOA laws have on the relative earnings of gays and lesbians. They use data from the 1990 5%
PUMS of the U.S. Census to regress individual earnings on interaction terms between sexual
orientation and the presence of both private and public employment laws, while controlling
for individual characteristics and location. The results from their analysis suggest that the
presence of a SOA law does not have a significant effect on the relative earnings of gays or
lesbians.
Recent studies have estimated regressions with pooled data from different time peri-
ods using a difference-in-difference-in-difference methodology. This methodology allows a
control group and pre-law differences between the control and treatment group to be iden-
tified. Neumark and Stock (2001) employs the DDD methodology to analyze the effect of
the passage of sex and race anti-discrimination laws at the state level. They find that race
anti-discrimination laws generally increase the relative earnings and employment of blacks
and that sex anti-discrimination laws increase relative earnings and decrease relative em-
ployment for women. Collins (2003) applies a similar DDD set up to the study of race
anti-discrimination laws and also finds, at least for the 1940’s, that the passage of race anti-
discrimination laws improved labor market outcomes for blacks. The DDD methodology
is also used by Beegle and Stock (2003) in order to study the impact that the passage of
disability anti-discrimination laws at the state level have on wages, employment, and labor
market participation of the disabled. Their findings are that disability anti-discrimination
laws generally lead to lower relative earnings and lower relative labor force participation for
the disabled, and they do not have an effect on their relative employment.
3 Model
The model for the effect of the passage of a SOA law is based on the model developed by
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) for the effect of disability anti-discrimination laws. Let the
9
wage paid to heterosexuals be represented by wa and the wage paid to gays and lesbians wg.
The labor supply of heterosexuals is then given by na(wa) and the labor supply of gays and
lesbians ng(wg). Both na and ng are assumed to be increasing in wa and wg respectively.
There are assumed to be M firms in the labor market that never exit and a large number
of potential firms that can enter the market at cost Γ. Firms are infinitely lived, risk neutral,
and have a discount factor of β < 1. They also have access to a increasing returns to scale
production function of the form F (Lt, e · Gt), where Lt is the number of heterosexuals and
Gt is the number of gays and lesbians employed by the firm at time t. The parameter e in
the production function is the relative productivity of gays and lesbians to heterosexuals.
The assumption is made that e ≤ 1, where e < 1 represents a situation in which the firm
has a taste for discrimination based on sexual orientation (Becker, 1971).3
A SOA law affects the cost to the firm of hiring gays and lesbians. This cost results
from the fact that the law allows gays and lesbians to bring lawsuits against firms over
perceived discrimination in hiring and firing practices. The probability that a gay or lesbian
job applicant that is not hired sues the firm is given by pg, and the expected cost of this
lawsuit is given by vg. Also, the probability that a gay or lesbian that is fired from a job
sues the firm is represented by qg, and the expected cost of this lawsuit is represented by ζg.
Therefore, the expected cost to the firm of not hiring a gay or lesbian is hg = pg · vg, and
the expected cost to the firm of firing a gay or lesbian is fg = qg · ζg. In effect, hg is a hiring
subsidy, and fg is a hiring cost faced by the firm. The assumption is made in this paper that
heterosexuals do not sue falsely claiming to be gays or lesbians. Thus, the passage of a SOA
law does not affect the firm’s cost of hiring heterosexuals.
Firms in this model face adverse match-specific shocks that cause the productivity of a
worker at his or her current job to fall to 0 with probability s each period. The assumption
3According to Becker (1971), if employers or workers have a taste for discrimination, then wages are lower
for the discriminated against group only if the fraction of discriminating employers is sufficiently large. This
wage differential is expected to disappear in the long-run in a competitive market or a market characterized
by constant returns to scale. Wage differentials are expected to persist in the long-run if consumers are those
with a taste for discrimination.
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is made that (1− β) · fg < wg, so firms that do receive adverse match-specific shocks always
lay off the fraction s of their employees. The number of gay and lesbian job applicants is
represented by Gf , and the number of heterosexual job applicant is represented by Lf , which
are both assumed to be given. Also, it is assumed that there is an excess supply of labor in
the labor market.
Under these conditions, the maximization problem of a firm at time t = 0 is
max
Gt,Lt
Π =
∞∑
t=0
βt · (F (Lt, e ·Gt)− wa,t · Lt − wg,t ·Gt − fg · s ·Gt−1
− hg · {Gf − [Gt − (1− s) ·Gt−1]}).
(2.1)
Following from Acemoglu and Angrist, firms immediately adjust to steady-state employment
levels in which wa,t = wa, wd,t = wd, Lt = L, and Gt = G in every period. The equilibrium
employment and wage levels are then given by
∂F (L, e ·G)
∂L
= wa
∂F (L, e ·G)
∂G
= wg + β · s · fg − [1− β · (1− s)] · hg,
(2.2)
which equate the marginal products of heterosexual and gay and lesbian workers to their
marginal costs.
Market clearing is imposed for heterosexual individuals so
n−1a (m · L) = wa, (2.3)
where n−1a is the inverse supply function, and m is the equilibrium number of firms. The
equilibrium number of firms is determined by
Π ≤ Γ,m ≥M, (2.4)
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where either the maximized value of profits is equal to entry costs, or there is no entry. In
the case of no entry, the number of firms, m, is equal to the minimum, M .
SOA laws also prohibit discrimination in pay. This equal pay provision also needs to be
considered in determining the wages and employment of gays and lesbians. In particular,
the wage that gays and lesbians earn is given by
wg = max[n
−1
g (m ·G), η · wa], (2.5)
where η is the parameter that represents the enforcement of the equal pay provision of
the SOA law. If n−1g (m · G) ≥ η · wa, then the equal pay provision is not binding, and
equilibrium employment for gays and lesbians is on their labor supply curve. On the other
hand, if n−1g (m · G) < η · wa, then employment for gays and lesbians is off of their labor
supply curve resulting in unemployment.
Clearly from the model a number of different scenarios could result for gays and lesbians
as the result of the passage of a SOA law. First assume the equal pay provision is not binding.
If the effect of the hiring subsidy is greater than the effect of the hiring cost arising from the
SOA law, or β · s · fg < [1 − β · (1 − s)] · hg, then gay and lesbian wages and employment
are expected to increase as a result of an increase in labor demand. On the other hand, if
the impact of the hiring subsidy is less than the impact of the hiring cost resulting from the
SOA law, or β · s · fg > [1 − β · (1 − s)] · hg, then gay and lesbian wages and employment
are expected to decrease as a result of a decrease in labor demand. A case could also exist
in which the effect of the hiring subsidy is equal to the effect of the hiring cost. In this case,
gay and lesbian wages and employment are expected to be unaffected by the passage of a
SOA law.
Now assume that n−1g (m · G) < η · wa, so that the equal pay provision is binding. A
binding equal pay provision by itself acts as a binding minimum wage law as it increases
gay and lesbian wages and reduces employment off of the labor supply curve. If a change in
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labor demand for gays and lesbians occurs due to a SOA law and the equal pay provision
is binding after this change, then the overall effect of the SOA law on gay and lesbian
employment outcomes is not as clear as when the equal pay provision is not binding. In the
case that there is an increase in labor demand for gays and lesbians, wages and employment
both increase. If wages are still less than heterosexual wages, meaning that the equal pay
provision is binding, then wages increase further while employment decreases. Therefore, the
overall effect of the SOA law in this case on gays and lesbians is an increase in wages and an
ambiguous effect on employment. On the other hand, a decrease in labor demand decreases
wages and employment, while the binding equal pay provision further decreases employment
but also increases wages. Thus, the overall effect of the SOA law in this situation is a fall in
employment and an ambiguous effect on wages.
The theoretical model indicates that the overall effect of the passage of a SOA law on the
wages and employment of gays and lesbians depends on whether the impact of the hiring sub-
sidy or the hiring cost is larger and on the impact of the equal pay provision. Data is needed
on the prevalence of sexual orientation employment discrimination complaints in order to
predict the effect of the passage of a SOA law. Rubenstein (2001) calculates population ad-
justed discrimination complaint rates for race, gender, and sexual orientation discrimination
complaints in states that have a SOA law. He finds that population adjusted complaint rates
for sexual orientation discrimination are in the same general range of population adjusted
complaint rates for race and gender discrimination. This finding shows that it is likely that
firms indeed have a reason to fear lawsuits by gays and lesbians when an SOA law makes
these lawsuits possible. Unfortunately, data is not available on the age and sex of those filing
the complaints and on if the complaints are over hiring or firing. Thus, it is not possible to
predict from the model the effect of the passage of a SOA law.
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4 Methodology
The difference-in-difference-in-difference methodology is utilized to investigate the impact of
SOA laws on the earnings and employment of gays and lesbians. The object of the DDD
methodology in policy analysis is to use a natural experiment to get a clean measure of
the effect of the policy in question. A natural experiment took place over the 1990’s in
that some states passed a SOA law (“treatment states”) while other states did not (“control
states”). The DDD methodology allows for a comparison of gay and lesbian and heterosexual
outcomes (the first difference) in states that did and did not pass a SOA law (the second
difference) over time (the third difference). In order to perform the DDD analysis, data is
pooled on gays and lesbians and heterosexuals from the 1990 and 2000 Census years.
The DDD equation is given as follows:
Yist = α +Xistβ1 + SORistβ2 + Statesβ3 + Y eartβ4+
(SORist ∗ States)β5 + (Y eart ∗ SORist)β6 + (States ∗ Y eart)β7+
(States ∗ SORist ∗ Y eart)β8 + ist,
(2.6)
where s indexes the two groups of states (those that did and did not pass a SOA law
from 1990-1998), t the two time periods (1990 and 2000), and i each individual. In this
equation, Y represents either earnings or employment; SOR is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if an individual is identified as being gay or lesbian and a 0 otherwise; State
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for states that passed a SOA law from 1990-
1998 and 0 otherwise; and Y ear is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the
year 2000 and a value of 0 for the year 1990. Also, X represents a matrix of standard
demographic characteristics of individual i for race, age and its square, education,4 ability
to speak English, the presence of a work limiting disability, the presence of children in the
4The education variables that are included are dummies for if the individual didn’t complete high school,
graduated high school, completed some college, earned an undergraduate degree, or earned a post under-
graduate degree. Did not complete high school is the omitted dummy from the regression.
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household, and residence in a metro area.
Following Collins (2003), in equation (2.6) β2 represents time and state in-variant differ-
ences between gays and lesbians and heterosexuals; β3 reflects time and sexual orientation
in-variant differences between the two groups of states; β4 captures state group and sexual
orientation in-variant differences over time; β5 represents time in-variant differences between
gays and lesbians and heterosexuals in the states that passed an SOA law relative to those
that did not; β6 reflects state in-variant changes in gay and lesbian labor market outcomes
relative to heterosexuals; and β7 captures sexual orientation in-variant changes over time in
the group of states that passed an SOA law relative to the group of states that did not. The
coefficient of interest in this paper is β8. This coefficient reflects the change in the labor
market outcome for gays and lesbians relative to that of heterosexuals in the states that did
and did not pass a law. Therefore, β8 is the DDD estimate.
Equation (2.6) is estimated for both earnings and employment. The earnings specification
is estimated using OLS. The dependent variable in this specification is the log of individual
wage and salary earnings for the year prior the the Census.5 The analysis is limited to only
those individuals that were private sector employees, that had positive earnings, and that
were full time employees. Full time employees are defined here as those that usually worked
30 or more hours a week and that worked 27 or more weeks in the previous year. Usual hours
worked per week and weeks worked last year are entered as control variables in addition to
the ones already mentioned in X. The employment specification is estimated using a probit
model. In this specification, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the individual was
employed in the week prior to the Census and a value of 0 otherwise. Only those individuals
that are identified as being in the labor force in the week prior to the Census are included
in the employment specification.
5Following from Beegle and Stock (2003), Neumark and Stock (2001), and Collins (2003), the earnings
regression is estimated conditional on the individual being employed. The controls to use from the Census
in a Heckman selection model are not clear.
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5 Data
The data necessary for this DDD analysis is from the 1990 and 2000 5% PUMS of the U.S.
Census.6 The Census does not ask individuals directly about their sexual orientation, but
beginning with the 1990 Census it has been possible to identify gay and lesbian individuals
that are a part of same-sex cohabitating relationships. Individuals in this paper are identified
as being gay or lesbian if they are part of a household with two adults of the same sex in
which the adults identified themselves as being in an unmarried partnership,7 neither adult
has had his or her age, sex, or relationship status imputed by the Census, both individuals
are at least 18 years old, and both live in the United States. Defining gays and lesbians in
this way and limiting the sample to just those individuals that are 19-64 years old, due to
the focus on labor market outcomes in this paper, allows for the identification of a total of
30,060 gays and 30,480 lesbians from the 1990 and 2000 5% PUMS.
One issue that arises with using Census data on same-sex cohabitating couples is whether
or not these couples are indeed gay and lesbian. Black et al. (2000) and Carpenter (2004)
both give an in depth analysis of this issue with both providing evidence that the same-sex
cohabitating couples identified on the Census are likely to be gay and lesbian. Black et
al. (2000) finds that the residence of 60% of partnered gays identified on the 1990 Census
are concentrated in just 20 cities. This finding wouldn’t be expected if those individuals
identified as partnered gays are actually a part of the general non-gay population. They also
find that there is a strong correlation between the concentration of partnered gays in cities
and the concentration of AIDS deaths among young men in those cities. Carpenter (2004)
identifies same-sex cohabitating couples from the Center for Disease Control’s Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). He shows that these couples are likely to actually
be gay and lesbian using information on their sexual behavior and family planning. This
6This data is publicly available from www.ipums.org.
7Gay and lesbian households are identified from the “relationship to household head” heading on the
Census. The categories under this heading are spouse, child, inlaw, unmarried partner, and other non-
relative.
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finding provides evidence that couples that identify themselves as being same-sex couples on
surveys are indeed gay or lesbian.
Another issue that arises is the possibility that some same-sex cohabitating couples fail
to report themselves as such due to a distrust of government run surveys. This possibility
could make the results of this analysis difficult to interpret if those gay and lesbian couples
that identify themselves as same-sex couples on the Census are different in someway from
those that do not. Black et al. (2000) shows using data from the General Social Survey (GSS)
and the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSS), which are both non-government run
surveys, that in fact the 1990 Census only identifies 35% of the total number of partnered gay
couples and 29% of the total number of partnered lesbian couples. They discuss, however,
that empirical findings for characteristics such as veteran status, education, and earnings
for individuals identified as being in same-sex cohabitating couples on the Census are very
similar to those for the same-sex cohabitating couples identified in the GSS and NHSS.
Additionally, Carpenter (2004) estimates gay and lesbian wage regressions using same-sex
couples from the BRFSS and finds that the results for these wage regressions do not differ
from the results of similar wage regressions using the same-sex couples that are identified on
the Census.
A final issue with using the Census data is that there is no way of knowing if the firm is
aware of the sexual orientation of the individuals that are identified as being gay or lesbian.
This problem is due to the fact that sexual orientation is different from race or sex in that it
must be revealed in someway by the individual to the firm. Therefore, the sexual orientation
variable used in the regressions is measured with error and unfortunately there is no way to
correct for this measurement error. The hope in this paper is that this measurement error
is limited by the fact that only gays and lesbians in cohabitating relationships are used in
the analysis.8
8This assertion is based on the assumption that gays and lesbians willing to enter into cohabitating
relationships are those that are the most open about their sexual orientation, although there is no concrete
evidence to back up this assumption.
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For the DDD setup in equation (2.6) it is necessary to identify individuals that are
heterosexual to use as a comparison group to gays and lesbians. The two different sets of
heterosexual individuals that can be identified from the Census are those individuals that are
married and those that are in cohabitating relationships with a member of the opposite sex.
The group of individuals that are used in this paper as the heterosexual comparison group
are those that are in cohabitating relationships with a member of the opposite sex. They
are chosen as the comparison group so that differences in labor market outcomes that arise
between gays and lesbians and their heterosexual counterparts resulting from the presence
of a marriage premium is not present in this analysis (Allegretto and Arthur, 2001). The
individuals in heterosexual cohabitating relationships are identified using the same criteria
that is used for the same-sex cohabitating couples. This process allows for the identification
of a total of 309,383 heterosexual males and 310,123 heterosexual females from the 1990 and
2000 5% PUMS.
The laws of interest in this paper are state laws that prohibit labor market sexual orienta-
tion discrimination in the private sector. Every state that has passed a private employment
SOA law has also passed a public employment SOA law. Also, some states have passed just
a public employment SOA law. This paper limits the analysis to just private employment
SOA laws because these are the laws that are most likely to have an impact on the labor
market outcomes of gays and lesbians, as they cover the most individuals. In addition to
states passing SOA laws, a number of cities have also passed SOA laws. Local level laws are
not considered in this paper because these laws differ greatly in their level of enforcement at
the local level.
The data on the year of passage for SOA laws comes from the NGLTF Policy Institute
(1998) and the Human Rights Campaign (2009). Only those states that passed a SOA law
between the years 1990 and 1998 are counted as being states that passed a SOA law for the
DDD analysis. From 1990 to 1998, the eight states that passed a SOA law were Connecticut
(1991), Hawaii (1991), California (1992), New Jersey (1992), Vermont (1992), Minnesota
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(1993), Rhode Island (1995), and New Hampshire (1998). Nevada passed a SOA law in
1999, but because this is the same year as the reference year for the reported earnings on
the 2000 Census Nevada is counted as not passing a SOA law. Also, it is clear from equation
(2.6) that observations from states that passed a SOA law prior to 1990 cannot be included
in the analysis. Therefore, observations from Minnesota (1989), Wisconsin (1982), and the
District of Columbia (1977) are excluded from the DDD analysis.9
Table 2.1 reports variable descriptive statistics for gays and lesbians, and table 2.2 reports
these statistics for heterosexual males and females. The descriptive statistics in each table
are grouped by Census year. Descriptive statistics for earnings are calculated for just those
individuals that had positive earnings, worked 27 or more weeks, 30 or more hours per week,
and earned a positive income in the previous year. Just those individuals that are part of
the labor force are included in the calculation of the employment statistics.
6 Results
The results for the estimation of the earnings and employment specifications of equation (2.6)
are reported in table 2.3 for males and females 19-64 years old. The individual productivity
controls used in each regression are statistically significant with the expected signs. The
coefficient on the triple interaction term SOR ∗ State ∗ Y ear is the DDD estimate for the
impact of the passage of a SOA law. The DDD estimates for the male sample reveal that
the passage of a SOA law leads to a 7.5% increase in the relative earnings of gays. This
increase in earnings is accompanied by a 2.5% reduction in the relative probability of being
employed. As for lesbians, the evidence suggests that a SOA law does not have an impact
on relative earnings or employment.
To further investigate the impact of a SOA law, each specification of equation (2.6) is
9In all, 21 states and the District of Columbia have passed a SOA law to date. The states that have
passed a SOA law in addition to the ones already mentioned are Maryland (2001), New Mexico (2003), New
York (2003), Maine (2005), Illinois (2006), Washington (2006), Colorado (2007), Iowa (2007), Oregon (2008),
and Delaware (2009).
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re-estimated for a 19-39 year old sample and a 40-64 year old sample of males and females.
The results for these re-estimations are reported in tables 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. The
results suggest that age does indeed have an influence on the impact of a SOA law on gays.
In particular, gays 19-39 years old experience a 8.6% increase in relative earnings without
an accompanying change in the relative probability of being employed. On the other hand,
gays 40-64 years old experience a 4.5% decline in the relative probability of being employed
without a change in relative earnings. Turning to the female 19-39 and 40-64 year old results,
the results again show that a SOA law does not have an effect on the relative earnings or
probability of being employed for lesbians.
The theoretical model presented in section 3 predicts that a simultaneous increase in
relative earnings and decrease in relative employment, as is observed for gays in the full
male sample regressions, is the result of a binding equal pay provision of a SOA law. The
statistically significant negative coefficient on the SOR variable in table 2.3 for males suggests
that the equal pay provision of a SOA law is indeed likely to be binding for gays. The evidence
also suggests that the rise in relative earnings for gays goes entirely to younger gays and the
reduction in relative employment falls entirely on older gays. Perhaps one reason for this
age difference is that older gays are easier to layoff because firms can claim the layoff is due
to declining productivity with age.
Provided in table 2.6 are the DDD estimates obtained from re-estimating the earnings
and employment specifications of equation (2.6) for a number of robustness checks of the
main results. One issue that arises in this analysis is that gays and lesbians could migrate
to states that have passed a SOA law if that law is leading to improved relative earnings
and employment outcomes. This migration may offset any increases in relative earnings or
employment that result from the passage of the SOA law. In order to deal with this issue,
each of the main regressions is re-estimated excluding those individuals from the year 2000
that had migrated from a different state within the last five years. The results from this
re-estimation are consistent in statistical significance and similar in magnitudes to the main
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results, suggesting that migration is not likely an issue in this analysis.
Another issue is regional differences may be influencing the main DDD estimates. States
located in some regions of the country appear to be more inclined than others to have
passed a SOA law by 1998. Therefore, the main DDD estimates may be picking up regional
changes in the relative earnings and employment of gays and lesbians instead of the effect
of a SOA law. This possibility is dealt with by re-estimating equation (2.6) adding regional
dummies for the northeast, south, midwest, and west. Also, interactions are included in
the re-estimation between the regional dummies and the sexual orientation dummy, time
dummy, and the sexual orientation and time interaction. In this re-estimation, statistical
significance is unchanged with the exception that the DDD estimate for the full male sample
employment specification is insignificant. As a result of including the regional controls, the
increase in relative earnings for gays 19-39 years old jumps to 16.6% and the decrease in the
relative probability of being employed for gays 40-64 years old increases to 6.2%.
An additional issue is that the inclusion of New Hampshire as a state that passed a SOA
law could be biasing the DDD estimates. New Hampshire passed their SOA law in 1998.
A law passed this late in the time period under consideration may not have given the law
enough time to have an impact on the relative earnings and employment of gays and lesbians.
This factor is taken into consideration by re-estimating the main regressions including New
Hampshire in the group of states that did not pass a law. The DDD estimates from this
re-estimation are again consistent in statistical significance and similar in magnitudes to the
main results.
Also, occupational controls have not been included in the earnings specification of the
main regressions because they may be endogenous. Leaving out occupational controls
presents a problem, however, in that occupations could be correlated with the passage of
a SOA law, resulting in an omitted variables problem. This problem could arise if sexual
orientation discrimination exists in certain occupations, and the passage of a SOA law allows
gays and lesbians to enter into these occupations. Therefore, the earnings specification of the
21
main regressions is re-estimated including occupational controls.10 There is not any change
in statistical significance from the main results for earnings as a result of this re-estimation.
A last issue is that there is the possibility that the passage of a SOA law is endogenous.
There are two reasons why this might be the case. One reason is that SOA laws could be less
costly to pass in states where gays and lesbians are performing relatively well in the labor
market and not facing discrimination. Another reason could be that SOA laws are passed
in response to gays and lesbians experiencing labor market discrimination and performing
relatively worse in the labor market. An examination of the passage of SOA laws over the
1990’s shows that they tended to be enacted in traditionally more liberal states. Thus, if
endogeneity does exist, it is likely to be the result of the first reason mentioned.
Evidence on the issue of endogeneity is provided by applying the technique used in Beegle
and Stock (2003) and Neumark and Stock (2001). In this technique, individual earnings
and employment in 1990 are regressed on the same control variables from X in equation
(2.6), individual state dummies, and a set of interaction terms between the individual state
dummies and sexual orientation dummy. The resulting coefficients on the state dummy and
sexual orientation dummy interaction terms are considered to represent year 1990 regression
adjusted state earnings and employment gaps for gays and lesbians. A binary variable for
if a state passed a SOA law by 1998 or not is then regressed on these regression adjusted
employment and earnings gaps using a probit model. This procedure is performed for both
male and female samples of the earnings and employment specifications. The results show
that 1990 gay earnings gaps, 1990 gay employment gaps, 1990 lesbian earnings gaps, and
1990 lesbian employment gaps all do not have a statistically significant impact on the passage
of SOA law by 1998. These results provide evidence that the passage of SOA laws is unlikely
to be endogenous.
10The occupational variables that are included are dummies for if the individual worked in a managerial and
professional specialty occupation; technical, sales, and administrative support occupation; service occupation;
precision production, craft, and repair occupation; operator, fabricator, and laborer occupation; and farming,
forestry, and fishing occupation. The managerial and professional specialty occupation is the omitted dummy
from the regression.
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7 Conclusion
This chapter improves upon previous studies of sexual orientation private employment anti-
discrimination (SOA) laws by being the first to use the difference-in-difference-in-difference
(DDD) methodology to analyze the impact of these laws. The benefit of using this method-
ology as opposed to cross sectional analysis is that differences in gay and lesbian employment
outcomes in states that did and did not have a law that existed before any laws were passed
can be controlled for, allowing for a cleaner measure of the impact of the law. Evidence
is provided that indicates that the passage of a SOA law has an impact on labor market
outcomes for gays and does not have an impact on labor market outcomes for lesbians. The
results from the main DDD regressions indicate that the passage of a SOA law causes the
wages of gays relative to heterosexual males to increase and the employment of gays relative
to heterosexual males to decrease. When the sample of gays is divided into an older and
younger sample, the results show that the increase in relative wages is experienced by the
younger gays, and the decrease in relative employment is experienced by the older gays. The
magnitudes of these effects are economically significant as the increase in relative wages for
younger gays is 8.6%, and the decrease in the relative probability of being employed for older
gays is 4.5%.
The analysis presented in this chapter, therefore, indicates that the passage of SOA laws
generally do not have the intended effect of improving the labor market outcome for gays
and lesbians. The theoretical model that is developed shows that this result is possible due
to the unintended effects of the SOA law on the incentives of firms to hire gays and lesbians.
This result has important implications for gay and lesbian rights groups that are expending
resources in order to have SOA laws passed. In particular, it suggests that a more effective
use of their resources may be on directly lobbying employers to not discriminate or on a
general education of society on sexual orientation discrimination. Use of resources in these
ways are unlikely to have the negative unintended consequences that the passage of SOA
laws can have.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Gays and Lesbians by Year
Gay 1990 Gay 2000 Lesbian 1990 Lesbian 2000
Earnings 37504.87a 38592.21 32878.92 38592.21
(472.78)b (296.09) (390.48) (296.09)
Hours 43.42 44.32 42.49 43.58
(0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07)
Weeks 49.66 50.05 44.32 49.76
(0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Employed 0.9495 0.9580 0.9555 0.9611
(0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0038) (0.0015)
Age 35.87 40.28 39.53 35.27
(0.13) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15)
Child 0.0594 0.1575 0.1215 0.2296
(0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0052) (0.0029)
High School degree 0.1526 0.2163 0.1538 0.2159
(0.0048) (0.0030) (0.0058) (0.0028)
Some college 0.2619 0.2256 0.2318 0.2344
(0.0059) (0.0030) (0.0067) (0.0030)
College degree 0.3188 0.2837 0.3215 0.2738
(0.0062) (0.0033) (0.0074) (0.0031)
Advanced degree 0.1597 0.1298 0.1863 0.1419
(0.0049) (0.0024) (0.0062) (0.0024)
Disability 0.0854 0.1286 0.0827 0.1125
(0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0044) (0.00220)
English 0.9944 0.9856 0.9957 0.9890
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0007)
Black 0.0628 0.0865 0.0828 0.1066
(0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0046) (0.0022)
Metro 0.9101 0.8470 0.8502 0.8098
(0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0056) (0.0026)
Observations 6497 23563 4664 25819
a Means are reported for all continuous variables and proportions for all
binary variables.
b Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Heterosexuals by Year
Male 1990 Male 2000 Female 1990 Female 2000
Earnings 31290.20a 34160.37 23459.58 26642.65
(92.18)b (94.84) (64.59) (72.21)
Hours 44.19 44.73 41.20 41.49
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Weeks 49.10 49.54 49.03 49.24
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Employed 0.9168 0.9344 0.9209 0.9279
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0008)
Age 34.18 35.33 32.16 33.80
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Child 0.1826 0.2203 0.2845 0.2742
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0011)
High School degree 0.3246 0.3317 0.3237 0.3046
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0012)
Some college 0.2199 0.2351 0.2469 0.2681
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0011)
College degree 0.1715 0.1765 0.1839 0.2012
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Advanced degree 0.0455 0.0429 0.0364 0.0454
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Disability 0.0757 0.1316 0.0650 0.1146
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
English 0.9946 0.9919 0.9919 0.9872
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Black 0.1490 0.1542 0.1309 0.1298
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0009)
Metro 0.7510 0.7706 0.7511 0.7698
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0010)
Observations 118432 190951 118392 191731
a Means are reported for all continuous variables and proportions for all
binary variables.
b Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Results for 19-64 Year Old Male and Female Samples
Male Earnings Male Employmentc Female Earnings Female Employment
Coefficient t-stata dF/dx z-stat Coefficient t-stat dF/dx z-stat
Age 0.0597 65.08***b 0.0009 2.65c*** 0.0577 63.92*** 0.0025 6.97***
Age squared -0.0006 -47.28*** 0.0000 -1.54 -0.0006 -48.90*** 0.0000 -3.11***
Child 0.0256 8.47*** 0.0125 10.60*** -0.0212 -7.39*** -0.0092 -7.83***
High School degree 0.1778 50.51*** 0.0307 26.37*** 0.1961 45.63*** 0.0423 34.39***
Some college 0.2593 67.36*** 0.0434 35.16*** 0.3140 71.06*** 0.0563 45.05***
College degree 0.4713 110.10*** 0.0574 43.76*** 0.5524 117.99*** 0.0717 54.57***
Advanced degree 0.7029 92.50*** 0.0550 28.72*** 0.7805 110.99*** 0.0597 33.48***
Disability -0.0613 -13.25*** -0.0041 -2.37** -0.0714 -14.78*** 0.0054 2.89***
English 0.3771 23.81*** 0.0167 2.88*** 0.3407 21.16*** 0.0590 9.36***
Black -0.1409 -38.08*** -0.0509 -31.56*** -0.0414 -10.44*** -0.0412 -24.28***
Metro 0.1279 43.95*** 0.0161 13.79*** 0.1730 61.15*** 0.0124 10.37***
Weeks 0.0317 118.73*** x x 0.0320 121.68*** x x
Hours 0.0119 70.11*** x x 0.0162 68.22*** x x
SOR -0.0517 -4.64*** 0.0081 1.81* 0.0609 4.71*** 0.0051 0.92
Year 0.0535 17.62*** 0.0149 12.26*** 0.0724 24.28*** 0.0028 2.28**
State 0.1414 29.49*** -0.0034 -1.84* 0.1655 35.33*** 0.0014 0.69
SOR*Year 0.0426 3.31*** 0.0055 1.04 0.0504 3.57*** 0.0145 2.52**
SOR*State -0.0261 -1.37 0.0034 0.44 -0.0136 -0.64 0.0098 0.85
State*Year -0.0587 -9.35*** -0.0059 -2.39** -0.0459 -7.44*** -0.0100 -3.76***
SOR*State*Year 0.0750 3.21*** -0.0235 -2.19** 0.0235 0.96 -0.0166 -1.13
Observations 251713 299008 218477 267078
R squared 0.32 0.40
a t-stats and z-stats are calculated using robust standard errors.
b Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
c dF/dx probabilities are reported for the probit estimation of employment specifications. The probabilities are calcu-
lated for binary variables by switching these variables from 0 to 1.
Table 2.4: Results for 19-39 Year Old Male and Female Samples
Male Earnings Male Employmentc Female Earnings Female Employment
Coefficient t-stata dF/dx z-stat Coefficient t-stat dF/dx z-stat
Age 0.1098 36.46***b 0.0080 6.64*** 0.1120 39.80*** 0.0080 6.74***
Age squared -0.0014 -27.74*** -0.0001 -6.17*** -0.0015 -31.19*** -0.0001 -5.27***
Child 0.0101 2.91*** 0.0118 8.39*** -0.0429 -12.90*** -0.0149 -10.14***
High School degree 0.1623 40.15*** 0.0336 24.36*** 0.1797 35.65*** 0.0485 32.31***
Some college 0.2309 52.52*** 0.0489 33.36*** 0.2764 53.84*** 0.0653 42.81***
College degree 0.4408 89.41*** 0.0627 39.71*** 0.5083 93.31*** 0.0830 51.03***
Advanced degree 0.6341 65.05*** 0.0595 22.17*** 0.6966 78.66*** 0.0648 27.69***
Disability -0.0479 -8.65*** 0.0004 0.19 -0.0579 -10.04*** 0.0109 4.58***
English 0.3411 17.62*** 0.0096 1.37 0.3286 17.41*** 0.0587 7.54***
Black -0.1326 -30.31*** -0.0619 -31.04*** -0.0360 -8.03*** -0.0464 -22.16***
Metro 0.1144 34.91*** 0.0166 11.79*** 0.1620 50.18*** 0.0144 9.80***
Weeks 0.0318 107.47*** x x 0.0321 110.86*** x x
Hours 0.0122 62.26*** x x 0.0168 60.61*** x x
SOR -0.0536 -4.24*** 0.0025 0.46 0.0451 3.23*** 0.0027 0.39
Year 0.0686 20.21*** 0.0159 10.96*** 0.0757 22.78*** 0.0045 3.02***
State 0.1411 26.55*** -0.0044 -2.00** 0.1664 32.32*** 0.0035 1.53
SOR*Year 0.0457 2.94*** 0.0028 0.43 0.0401 2.55** 0.0196 2.78***
SOR*State -0.0198 -0.90 0.0007 0.07 -0.0009 -0.04 0.0145 0.97
State*Year -0.0676 -9.56*** -0.0051 -1.72* -0.0532 -7.69*** -0.0128 -3.92***
SOR*State*Year 0.0858 3.06*** -0.0092 -0.73 0.0344 1.21 -0.0304 -1.46
Observations 176011 207081 156466 192925
R squared 0.32 0.40
a t-stats and z-stats are calculated using robust standard errors.
b Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
c dF/dx probabilities are reported for the probit estimation of employment specifications. The probabilities are calcu-
lated for binary variables by switching these variables from 0 to 1.
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Table 2.5: Results for 40-64 Year Old Male and Female Samples
Male Earnings Male Employmentc Female Earnings Female Employment
Coefficient t-stata dF/dx z-stat Coefficient t-stat dF/dx z-stat
Age 0.0453 6.56***b -0.0008 -0.37 0.0460 6.38*** 0.0074 3.06***
Age squared -0.0004 -5.84*** 0.0000 0.70 -0.0004 -5.87*** -0.0001 -2.51**
Child 0.0541 8.88*** 0.0151 7.16*** 0.0156 2.71*** 0.0083 4.34***
High School degree 0.2127 30.13*** 0.0246 11.34*** 0.2285 27.94*** 0.0273 12.77***
Some college 0.3245 41.47*** 0.0297 12.94*** 0.3996 46.01*** 0.0333 15.27***
College degree 0.5249 61.72*** 0.0428 17.9*** 0.6218 66.66*** 0.0413 18.30***
Advanced degree 0.7891 64.82*** 0.0461 15.80*** 0.8930 76.33*** 0.0454 17.05***
Disability -0.0846 -10.19*** -0.0134 -4.70*** -0.0940 -10.76*** -0.0058 -2.06**
English 0.4719 18.19*** 0.0379 3.59*** 0.3881 13.30*** 0.0656 6.19***
Black -0.1556 -22.57*** -0.0284 -10.5*** -0.0535 -6.51*** -0.0298 -10.57***
Metro 0.1573 26.25*** 0.0135 6.62*** 0.1944 33.81*** 0.0055 2.79***
Weeks 0.0310 52.45*** x x 0.0310 50.50*** x x
Hours 0.0110 33.35*** x x 0.0145 31.96*** x x
SOR -0.0452 -1.98** 0.0186 2.37** 0.1068 3.62*** 0.0070 0.79
Year 0.0191 2.90*** 0.0144 6.44*** 0.0768 11.54*** -0.0002 -0.09
State 0.1402 13.24*** -0.0001 -0.03 0.1588 14.66*** -0.0060 -1.62
SOR*Year 0.0406 1.64 0.0057 0.62 0.0326 1.06 0.0075 0.80
SOR*State -0.0463 -1.25 0.0093 0.69 -0.0518 -1.16 0.0038 0.23
State*Year -0.0415 -3.13*** -0.0085 -1.89* -0.0328 -2.45** -0.0017 -0.38
SOR*State*Year 0.0675 1.58 -0.0446 -2.23** 0.0300 0.62 0.0013 0.07
Observations 75702 91927 62011 74153
R squared 0.24 0.32
a t-stats and z-stats are calculated using robust standard errors.
b Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
c dF/dx probabilities are reported for the probit estimation of employment specifications. The probabilities are calcu-
lated for binary variables by switching these variables from 0 to 1.
Table 2.6: Summary of DDD Estimates for Robustness Checks
Migrants Excluded W/Regions NH Switched W/Occupations
Sample Earnings Employmentc Earnings Employment Earnings Employment Earnings
Male 19-64 0.0729***b -0.0221*** 0.1339*** -0.0224 0.0691*** -0.0222*** 0.0780***
(3.05)a (-2.00) (4.10) (-1.41) (2.95) (-2.08) (3.42)
Male 19-39 0.0882*** -0.0089 0.1664*** -0.0052 0.0769*** -0.0078 0.0914***
(2.98) (-0.66) (4.26) (-0.29) (2.73) (-0.62) (3.32)
Male 40-64 0.0591 -0.0381* 0.0732 -0.0615* 0.0688 -0.0446** 0.0590
(1.38) (-1.95) (1.26) (-1.95) (1.61) (-2.23) (1.41)
Female 19-64 0.0125 -0.0153 0.0184 -0.0004 0.0222 -0.0131 0.0191
(0.50) (-1.04) (0.64) (-0.02) (0.90) (-0.90) (0.80)
Female 19-39 0.0243 -0.0302 0.0320 -0.0144 0.0267 -0.0226 0.0243
(0.83) (-1.42) (0.94) (-0.58) (0.92) (-1.12) (0.87)
Female 40-64 0.0212 0.0019 0.0173 0.0138 0.0380 -0.0001 0.0428
(0.44) (0.11) (0.32) (0.66) (0.78) (-0.01) (0.91)
a t-stats and z-stats are calculated using robust standard errors.
b Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
c dF/dx probabilities are reported for the probit estimation of employment specifications. The probabilities are
calculated for binary variables by switching these variables from 0 to 1.
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Chapter 3
A Spatial Migration Model to
Investigate the Preferences of Gays
and Lesbians for State Legislation
1 Introduction
Gay and lesbian rights groups lobby for legislation to be passed at all levels of government
that would extend certain rights and protections to gay and lesbian individuals. The pieces
of legislation that are most commonly sought after are those that allow gays and lesbians to
enter into legally recognized relationships, increase the punishment for hate based crimes,
and that outlaw sexual orientation discrimination in employment and other facets of life.
The passage of such legislation is often met with fierce resistance by conservative groups
and politicians alike. Due to this fierce resistance, legislation granting these rights and
protections to gays and lesbians has not gained widespread passage at the local, state, or
federal levels of government. In fact, the only gay and lesbian rights law to be enacted at
the federal level is a sexual orientation hate crime law that was signed into law on October
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28, 2009, after years of debate.1 Debate over the passage of other gay and lesbian rights
legislation at all levels of government continues today.2 Despite this ongoing debate, little is
known on the actual preferences of gays and lesbians for the passage of particular legislation.
Knowledge on the preferences of gays and lesbians for particular laws is important to
both gay and lesbian rights groups and politicians. Gay and lesbian rights groups need to
know on which types of legislation, if any, to use their limited resources on in attempting
to get passed. Politicians should have an idea of if the costs involved with debating and
enacting particular legislation result in actual benefits for gays and lesbians. Furthermore,
state and local politicians can use information on the laws gays and lesbians benefit from in
order to try to attract these individuals to their regions. Attracting gays and lesbians may
be desirable because research has shown that locations with a larger creative class, which
gays and lesbians are often assumed to be a part of, experience higher economic growth
(Florida, 2002).
One method that can be used to determine the preferences of gays and lesbians for legis-
lation is to infer those preferences from existing survey and empirical data on the existence
of discrimination against these individuals. This method is problematic, however, as the
evidence from existing research on the presence of discrimination against gays and lesbians
is mixed. Evidence pointing towards the existence of discrimination is provided by Herek
(2009), which shows using survey data that gays and lesbians at least perceive themselves
as being targets of hate crimes. Also, Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) and Allegretto and Arthur
(2001) provide evidence that gays face labor market discrimination and results from Badgett
(1995) indicate that both gays and lesbians are subject to labor market discrimination. On
the other hand, Klawitter and Flatt (1998) finds that the presence of private employment
anti-discrimination laws at a location do not have an effect on employment outcomes of gays
1The Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 was passed as an Amendment to the
National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2010 (The Library of Congress, 2010).
2The Employment Non Discrimination Act (ENDA) is a proposed bill in Congress that would create
a federal law making it a crime to discriminate in private employment based on an individual’s sexual
orientation. This bill was first introduced by the 103rd Congress in 1994 and has been introduced by each
Congress since then, except for the 109th (The Library of Congress, 2009).
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and lesbians, suggesting that discrimination against gays and lesbians may not exist.
Inference concerning the preferences of gays and lesbians for legislation can also be made
using survey results concerning the knowledge of gays and lesbians on the existence of certain
gay and lesbian rights and protection laws. If gays and lesbians truly have a preference for
the passage of legislation, then the expectation is that they would be knowledgeable on at
least the gay and lesbian rights laws of the country and state that they reside in. In a
nationally representative survey conducted by Egan et al. (2008), of the 768 gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals questioned, only 59% of the respondents knew that there was not a federal
law that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation at the time of the survey.
Additionally, only 38% of poll respondents answered all four questions on the existence
of particular state and federal laws that were asked on the survey correctly. These low
poll results provide evidence that gays and lesbians don’t invest much time in learning
about legislation. This finding seems to suggest that certain types of rights and protection
legislation may not be important to gays and lesbians.
Another approach that can be taken to analyze the preferences of gays and lesbians is to
study their revealed preferences for particular legislation through their migration decisions.
This approach is based on the model set forth by Tiebout (1956), which suggests that
individuals “vote with their feet” for particular public policies. This revealed preferences
method for analyzing gay and lesbian preferences has yet to be used in the literature and is
the method that is used in this paper. The benefit of this revealed preferences approach is
that examining the actual choices of gays and lesbians is likely to provide more insight into
their preferences rather than trying to infer these preferences.
The particular migration model that is used is a gravity model of gay and lesbian state-to-
state migration flows from 1995-2000. The specific gay and lesbian rights and protections laws
that are the focus of this paper are those that varied between states as of 1994. These laws
are hate crime laws, private employment anti-discrimination laws, public employment anti-
discrimination laws, and domestic partnership laws. The gravity model of gay and lesbian
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state-to-state migration flows is estimated using the spatial autoregressive Tobit model. The
spatial autoregressive model is used because there is the likelihood of spatial dependence
occurring in the migration flows of gays and lesbians due to sharing of information between
gays and lesbians at proximate locations. The Tobit version of this model is employed because
it appears from the large number of zero state-to-state gay and lesbian migration flows in
the data that gays and lesbians receive negative utility from making certain state-to-state
moves.
The results from the estimation of this model provide evidence that gays and lesbians
do have a preference for certain types of gay and lesbian rights legislation. In particular,
evidence is provided from the main model specification that sexual orientation hate crime
laws and public employment anti-discrimination laws increase in-migration, while private
employment anti-discrimination laws reduce in-migration. Additionally, it is found that
the existence of domestic partnership laws do not have an impact on in-migration or out-
migration. These results are generally robust to re-estimations of the main model using
different cutoff years for the existence of legislation, separate gay and lesbian samples, and
using variable definitions for legislation that include local legislation in addition to state
legislation.
2 Literature Review
The only study to date that has taken an econometric approach to analyzing the location
of gays and lesbians is Black et al. (2002), which specifically focused on the location of
gay households. Their paper argues that gay households demand less housing space than
heterosexual households because gay households are less likely to have children. Therefore,
gay households have more income to spend on adult related amenities than heterosexual
households. This difference in economic constraints between gay and heterosexual house-
holds leads to gay households concentrating in cities that have higher levels of adult related
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amenities. Regressions are used that regress a citys gay household concentration on the
amenities and the citizen attitudes towards homosexuality in a city. The results from these
regressions provide evidence that amenities have a strong positive effect on gay concentration
in a city, but citizen attitudes do not have an effect on this concentration. The same general
results are found for lesbian households as well, although the amenity effect is not as strong
since lesbian households are more likely to have children than gay households.
There are issues with Black et al. (2002) that make it a less than ideal study of factors
important for gay and lesbian location. For one, it does not take into consideration the
effect of the presence of gay and lesbian legislation at a particular location. According to
Tiebout (1956), individuals sort themselves into locations based on their preferences for
the public policies offered at that location. Therefore, the presence of different types of
legislation at a location possibly influences gay and lesbian location decisions differently
than the general populations. This legislation is likely correlated with amenities and the
public attitude toward homosexuality, confounding the results of the study. Another issue is
that a regression of only the concentration of gays and lesbians at a particular time on a set
of variables is likely to suffer from endogeneity. It is not possible to tell if gays and lesbians
are located in the city because of amenities, attitudes, or legislation, or if these attributes of
the city have resulted from gays and lesbians choosing to locate in the city for some other
reason.
The approach often used to analyze the revealed preferences of individuals for specific
public policies is to study their migration decisions. Examples of public policies that have
been analyzed in the migration literature are the effect of government taxation and expen-
ditures on elderly migration (Conway and Houtenville, 2001; Conway and Rork, 2006; Clark
and Hunter, 1992; Conway and Houtenville, 2003), the effect of welfare benefits on the mi-
gration of female headed households (Blank, 1988) and the migration of the poor (Cebula
and Koch, 1989), and the effect of various economic freedom indicators on overall migration
(Ashby, 2007). Migration models in the regional science literature typically use the gravity
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model of migration as a starting point. This model is derived from the equation for grav-
itational force from the physical sciences and explains origin to destination migration as a
function of the population at the two locations and the distance between them (Greenwood,
1975; Borjas, 1989). The gravity model is normally modified to include controls for other
locational attributes likely to affect migration decisions. The other attributes that have com-
monly been found to impact migration and that have been included in gravity models are
those concerning economic opportunity (Fields, 1979; Greenwood et al., 1986; Greenwood
and Hunt, 1989), natural amenities such as climate (Graves, 1979; Cushing, 1987), and cost
of living (Fournier et al., 1988).
Cushing and Poot (2004) points out that one issue with the current migration literature
is that spatial econometric techniques have been under utilized. This under utilization is
a clear problem as LeSage and Pace (2008) provides evidence that migration models that
control for spatial dependence are superior to those that do not. Ashby (2007) is one mi-
gration study that does incorporate spatial econometrics. He develops a methodology that
can be used to apply spatial econometrics to a state-to-state migration flows model and a
similar methodology to his is used in this paper. This model is used in Ashby (2007) to
analyze migration responses to measures of state economic freedom and evidence is provided
that individuals ”vote with their feet” by migrating to states with relatively higher govern-
ment expenditures and transfers, smaller tax burdens, and lower minimum wages and union
densities.
3 Methodology
The typical gravity model of state-to-state migration flows takes the following reduced form:
mij = α0 + αipi + αjpj+
αddij + βiXi(.) + βjXj(.) + uij,
(3.1)
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where mij is the migrant flow from origin state i to destination state j, pi is the population
of the origin, pj is the population of the destination, dij is the distance between the origin
and destination, and Xi(.) and Xj(.) include a set of other characteristics of i and j that
potentially influences migration flows between the two locations. The distance between the
origin and destination is included on the right hand to control for the psychic and monetary
costs of migration, as these costs are likely to increase with the distance of a move. Origin and
destination populations are included because origins with larger populations experience more
out migration and those migrants are likely attracted to other places with large populations.
Other origin and destination characteristics that are typically included in gravity models
include controls for economic opportunity, amenities, cost of living, and public policies at
the origin and destination. Migration flows and population often enter into the equation in
log form, while the other independent variables enter in level or log form.
Gravity models of origin-destination flows have historically been estimated using OLS.
The use of OLS results in biased and inefficient parameter estimates though in the presence
of spatially dependent variables. Migration flows are likely to exhibit spatial dependence
as individuals in states located near each other are culturally and economically similar and
are therefore likely to migrate to similar locations. Recent research has shown that spatial
dependence is not fully accounted for by only controlling for distance in the OLS model (Lee
and Pace, 2005; LeSage and Pace, 2009; Tiefelsdorf, 2003). Results from these studies suggest
that spatial econometric techniques that include a spatial lag of the dependent variable are
more appropriate than OLS in estimating gravity models of origin-destination flows.
When using spatial econometric models a weight matrix must be constructed that rep-
resents the spatial dependence that exists in the dependent variable. This spatial weight
matrix is usually an n× n matrix that represents spatial connectivity using a distance, con-
tiguity, or closest neighbor criteria. The selection of the weight matrix to use in the model is
often done ad hoc and a priori by the researcher. One way in which the n×n weight matrix
is often constructed is as a standardized first order rook contiguity matrix. This type of
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weight matrix is constructed by entering a value of one into the matrix if two locations share
a border with each other and a zero into the matrix if they do not. The weight matrix is
then standardized by dividing the entries across each row by the number of non-zero values
in the row.
In an origin-destination flows model the typical n×n weight matrix must be transformed
into an n2× n2 matrix. This transformation is necessary because for each pair of locations i
and j in the model there are two observations that are included in the model. One observation
is included for the flow of migrants from i to j and another observation for the flow of
migrants from j to i. The way this transformation is performed depends on the type of
spatial dependence in the origin-destination flows that is assumed. One possible weight
matrix, Wo, can be constructed as the spatial dependence of an origin to destination flow on
the average of flows from the neighbors of the origin to the destination. Another possible
weight matrix, Wd, is one that captures the spatial dependence of an origin to destination
flow on the average of flows from the origin to the neighbors of the destination. A third
possibility is a weight matrix Ww that captures the influence of the average of flows from the
neighbors of the origin to the neighbors of the destination on the origin to destination flow.
Following from Ashby (2007), the model that is estimated in this paper uses the Wo
spatial weight matrix. The reason for assuming the spatial relationship takes this form is
that it is likely gays and lesbians that are located in neighboring locations have contact
with each other and share information about possible migration destinations. Therefore, the
migration flows from neighboring origins to the same destination are the most likely flows
to exhibit dependence. A Kronecker product of the form W ⊗ In, where W is the n × n
standardized first order rook contiguity matrix and In is an n dimension identity matrix, is
used to create the n2 × n2 Wo matrix.3
In a typical state-to-state migration model an observation is included for a migration flow
from each of the 49 origin states (the continental 48 states and the District of Columbia,
3The creation of the Wo matrix in this manner assumes that the dependent variable vector is formed so
that it is sorted first by each origin location and then by each destination location.
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which from here on is considered to be a state) to each of the 48 destination states, resulting
in 2352 observations. An adjustment must be made though when using a spatial model of
origin-destination flows since the weight matrix used in this model must be a square matrix.
The adjustment that is used in this paper follows from Ashby (2007) in that an observation
is included for the migration flow from each of the 49 origin states to themselves. Included
in this observation is the number of individuals that did not migrate out of the state over
the migration period. This number is calculated by subtracting gay and lesbian migrants
into the state over the period 1995-2000 from the 2000 state gay and lesbian population. In
order to separate the effect of these 49 stayer observations from the 2352 flow observations
that are of interest, the constant is excluded from the model and in its place two dummy
variables are included that represent if a migration flow observation represents those that
are staying in the origin state or those that are migrating from the origin to destination.
An issue that is encountered when estimating this model is that 56% of the values on
the dependent variable of gay and lesbian state-to-state migration flows are zero. The large
number of zero flows suggests that the use of the typical spatial autoregressive model in ana-
lyzing gay and lesbian migration results in biased estimates. The approach that is employed
to deal with this issue is to use the Tobit model to estimate the regression equation, as is
suggested by LeSage and Pace (2009). The motivation for the use of the Tobit Model in this
situation is that individuals in certain origin states can be thought of as receiving negative
utility from moving to certain destination states. Therefore, non-zero gay and lesbian state-
to-state migration flows are observed with some probability and the positive flows take on a
continuous distribution.
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The spatial autoregressive Tobit model for the gravity model takes the form:
mij =
 0 if m
∗
ij ≤ 0
m∗ij if m
∗
ij > 0

m∗ij = ρWom
∗
ij + αsstayer + αmmover + αipi + αjpj+
αddij + βoXi(.) + βdXj(.) + uij, where uij is N(0, σ
2In).
(3.2)
A Bayesian estimation approach is used to estimate the spatial autoregressive Tobit model
because the maximum likelihood estimation of this model is difficult (LeSage and Pace, 2009).
Diffuse priors are used for the Bayesian estimation because no prior information is known
for the parameters of the model. The interpretation of the results from Bayesian estimation
differ from their interpretation in the classical approach in that the concept of a confidence
interval does not exist in the Bayesian approach as it does in the classical approach. The
significance level in Bayesian estimation is based on a posterior density interval. This interval
is interpreted as an interval the researcher is 95% (for a 5% significance level) certain to
contain the true value of the coefficient being estimated (Kennedy, 2008).
The use of a spatial model allows direct, indirect, and total effects for each of the in-
dependent variables to be calculated. The direct effect represents the average effect that a
change in the independent variable of an observation has on it’s own dependent variable.
This coefficient includes the initial impact of the change in an independent variable on it’s
dependent variable as well as feedback in the system. This feedback occurs when the change
in the dependent variable causes changes in the other dependent variables of the system
through the spatial weight matrix that in turn feedback onto the initial dependent variable.
The indirect effect represents the average spatial spill over effect that a change in an inde-
pendent variable has on all other dependent variables, excluding it’s own. The total effect
is the sum of the direct and indirect effects. The results for the direct effects are the main
focus of this paper due to the interest in gay and lesbian preferences.
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4 Data
The focus of this paper is on the migration flows of the gay and lesbian population. The
data on gay and lesbian state-to-state migration flows is from the 5% PUMS of the 2000 U.S.
Census.4 The Census does not ask individuals directly about their sexual orientation, but
beginning with the 1990 Census it has been possible to identify gay and lesbian individuals
that are a part of same-sex cohabitating relationships. Individuals are identified as being gay
or lesbian if they are part of a household with two adults of the same sex in which the adults
identified themselves as being in an unmarried partnership,5 neither adult has had his or her
age, sex, or relationship status imputed by the Census, both individuals in the household
reside in the continental United States, and both are between the ages 25-65. Defining gays
and lesbians in this way and using Census sampling weights allows for the identification of
930,917 gays and lesbians residing in the United States in the year 2000.
One issue that arises with using Census data on same-sex cohabitating couples is whether
or not these couples are indeed gay and lesbian. Black et al. (2000) and Carpenter (2004)
both give an in depth analysis of this issue with both providing evidence that the same-sex
cohabitating couples identified on the Census are likely to be gay and lesbian. Black et al.
(2000) finds that the residence of 60% of partnered gays identified on the 1990 Census are
concentrated in just 20 cities. This finding wouldn’t be expected if those individuals identified
as partnered gays were actually a part of the general non-gay population. They also find that
there is a strong correlation between the concentration of partnered gays in cities and the
concentration of AIDS deaths among young men in those cities. Carpenter (2004) identifies
same-sex cohabitating couples from the Center for Disease Control’s Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS) and shows that these couples are likely to be gay and lesbian
using information on the sexual behavior and family planning of these couples. This finding
4This data is publicly available from www.ipums.org.
5Gay and lesbian households are identified from the “relationship to household head” heading on the
Census. The categories under this heading are spouse, child, inlaw, unmarried partner, and other non-
relative.
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provides evidence that couples that identify themselves as being same-sex couples on surveys
are indeed gay or lesbian.
Another issue that arises is the possibility that some same-sex cohabitating couples fail
to report themselves as such due to a distrust of government run surveys. This possibility
could make the results of this analysis difficult to interpret if those gay and lesbian couples
that identify themselves as same-sex couples on the Census are different in someway from
those that do not. Black et al. (2000) shows using data from the General Social Survey (GSS)
and the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSS), which are both non-government run
surveys, that in fact the 1990 Census only identifies 35% of the total number of partnered gay
couples and 29% of the total number of partnered lesbian couples. They discuss, however,
that empirical findings for characteristics such as veteran status, education, and earnings
for individuals identified as being in same-sex cohabitating couples on the Census are very
similar to those for the same-sex cohabitating couples identified in the GSS and NHSS. Also,
Carpenter (2004) estimates gay and lesbian wage regressions using same-sex couples from
the BRFSS and finds that the results for these wage regressions do not differ from the results
of similar wage regressions using the same-sex couples that are identified on the Census.
Migration moves in this paper are calculated from the PUMS as those gay and lesbian
individuals that lived in a different state than their current residence 5 years prior to the 2000
Census. Individual state-to-state migration moves are identified in this fashion and summed
to get the aggregate state-to-state migration flows between the years 1995-2000. Table 3.1
shows the top out-migrant and in-migrant flow of each state, while table 3.2 provides data
on the total gay and lesbian out-migration, in-migration, and net-migration for each state.
Also provided in tables 3.1 and 3.2 is an estimate of the gay and lesbian population in each
state at the beginning of the migration period. The method that is used for this estimation
is to add the number of non-migrants to the number of out-migrants for each state.
The explanatory variables of interest in this paper are those that represent state gay and
lesbian rights and protection legislation. As of 1994, the four areas of rights and protections
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for gays and lesbians that states differed in their laws regarding were public employment anti-
discrimination laws, private employment anti-discrimination laws, domestic partnership laws,
and hate crime laws. States that had passed private employment anti-discrimination laws
had in most cases also passed some combination of other private market anti-discrimination
laws regarding housing markets, credit markets, union practices, and education. These other
anti-discrimination laws are highly correlated with the private employment law and including
all of these laws in the analysis presents an issue with multi-collinearity. Thus, out of these
laws only the presence of a private employment anti-discrimination law is included as an
explanatory variable.
The data on the presence of public employment anti-discrimination, private employment
anti-discrimination, hate crime, and domestic partnership laws in states and the years in
which the laws were passed comes from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (1998)
and Rimmerman et al., eds (2000). Provided in table 3.3 is a list of the states that had
and had not passed each of these types of laws by 1994 and the years in which the laws
were passed. These laws enter into the regression as separate origin and destination dummy
variables that take the value of one if the state had passed the particular law by 1994 and
that take a value of zero if they had not.
The year 1994 is used as the cutoff year for two primary reasons. First off, the migration
data from the 5% PUMS only allows the migration of an individual to be identified from that
person living in a different location than they did five years previously. This identification
process means that it is not possible to know the year in which the person migrated to their
2000 residence. If for example 1996 is used as the cutoff for legislation and an individual
migrated in 1995, then bias is introduced into the coefficients. Also, 1994 is used as the
cutoff to reduce the possibility of endogenity between the migration flows and the passage
of the laws. Endogeneity could exist as an increase in gay and lesbian migration into a state
increases the gay and lesbian population, which in turn gives them more political power
to pass legislation. However, since gays and lesbians are a relatively small portion of the
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population endogeneity in this form is likely not much of an issue.
Domestic partnership laws entitle the partners of gays and lesbians to some or all of
the same employer benefits often offered to the spouses and children of married individuals.
The three states that had passed a law allowing for gays and lesbians to enter into domestic
partnerships as of 1994 were Vermont, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia. An issue
that arises in interpreting the results for this variable is that some employers voluntarily offer
domestic partnership benefits in the absence of a state law. Therefore, it may appear in the
data that an individual is moving to a location without this law, when in reality the employer
at the location they are moving to is providing domestic partner benefits. Nevertheless, the
results for this variable still give an indication of the effect that legal recognition at the
state level of gay and lesbian relationships has on the migration of gays and lesbians. The
expectation then is that the presence of a law allowing for domestic partnerships in a state
increases the migration flow of gays and lesbians into the state and reduces the flow out
of the state. This result should especially be true for those gays and lesbians that are in
partnered relationships and these are the gays and lesbians that are the focus of this paper.
As of 1994, 16 states had a hate crime law that included crimes that are based on a
person’s sexual orientation as a hate crime.6 Sexual orientation hate crime laws legislate that
in crimes in which the victim is specifically targeted because of his or her sexual orientation
the perpetrator of the crime receives a harsher penalty than he or she normally would.
The reason for this harsher penalty is that it is believed that hate crimes cause especially
harsh psychological damages to the victims of the crimes and to those individuals that are
a part of the entire gay and lesbian community. Since the prevalence of hate crimes against
gays and lesbians may be correlated, either positively or negatively, with the passage of a
hate crime law, data should be included into the analysis on the prevalence of hate crimes.
Unfortunately, accurate sexual orientation hate crime data is not available at the state level
6Arizona, Maryland, and Utah included sexual orientation in their hate crimes data collection law as of
1994, but not in the state’s penalty laws. Also, Texas’s hate crime law could be interpreted as including
sexual orientation but was basically unenforceable due to vague language. Therefore, these states are not
included as having sexual orientation hate crimes legislation (NGLTF, 1998).
41
for the time period under consideration. However, a control variable is included in the
analysis for the liberalness of a state, and this control is likely correlated with the prevalence
of hate crimes. The presence of a hate crime law is expected to increase the in-migration and
decrease the out-migration of gays and lesbians as it is expected to reduce the prevalence of
hate crimes.
Sexual orientation private employment anti-discrimination laws prohibit discrimination
in hiring, firing, and pay in private employment based on a person’s sexual orientation. A
private employment anti-discrimination law had been passed by eight states as of 1994. The
effect of this law on the employment outcomes of gays and lesbians is not evident a priori.
The reason for this is that a private employment anti-discrimination law reduces the costs
of hiring and increases the costs of firing gays and lesbians to the firm, as it increases the
probability of the firm facing a lawsuit in each of these situations. A reduction in the costs
of hiring gays and lesbians increases the labor demand for them, while an increase in the
costs of firing gays and lesbians reduces the labor demand for them. Interacting with these
effects is the equal pay provision of the private employment anti-discrimination law which
requires gays and lesbians to be paid equal to heterosexuals performing similar jobs. This
provision acts as a minimum wage law by increasing wages and reducing employment if the
wage of gays and lesbians falls below the wage of heterosexuals.
Although the expected effect of a private employment anti-discrimination law is the-
oretically ambiguous, empirical evidence exists regarding the effect of the law. Evidence
provided by Klawitter and Flatt (1998) suggests that the existence of a private employment
anti-discrimination law does not affect the wages of gays or lesbians. Additionally, chap-
ter 2 of this dissertation provides evidence that suggests gays experience higher wages and
lower employment, while lesbian employment outcomes are unaffected, by the passage of
a private employment anti-discrimination law. Taking these studies into consideration, the
expected impact of a private employment anti-discrimination law on the in-migration and
out-migration of gays is ambiguous. For lesbians, the expectation is that the law has no
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impact on the migration.
Sexual orientation public employment anti-discrimination laws prohibit discrimination in
hiring, firing, and pay in public employment based on a person’s sexual orientation. A public
employment anti-discrimination law had been passed by 13 states as of 1994.7 The theoretical
impact regarding employment outcomes of a public employment anti-discrimination law is
the same as a private employment one since it includes identical provisions. Despite this,
the public employment anti-discrimination law covers relatively few jobs in the economy.
Therefore, it likely does not have an effect on gay and lesbian migration through its impact
on employment outcomes. However, the law may still have an impact on migration, as
gays and lesbians may receive utility from the existence of the law in itself. If this is the
case, the existence of the public employment anti-discrimination law is expected to increase
in-migration and reduce out-migration of gays and lesbians.
In fact, the possibility that gays and lesbians receive utility from the existence of a law in
itself is a possibility for all of the pieces of legislation in this analysis. The reasoning for this
possibility is that gays and lesbians likely receive negative utility from having to hide their
sexual orientation in the work place and other facets of life. The presence of a particular
gay and lesbian rights or protection law may make gay and lesbian individuals less stressed
over hiding their sexual orientation, increasing their happiness (Badgett, 2001). In addition
to each of the effects of the laws already mentioned above, if laws in themselves have value
to gays and lesbians then this effect is expected to cause the presence of each law to increase
the in-migration and decrease the out-migration of gays and lesbians.
Gays and lesbians are often thought of as choosing to live in locations that are more
liberal. The likelihood exists that the liberalness of a location is correlated with the ex-
istence of gay and lesbian rights legislation. Therefore, the liberalness of a state must be
controlled for in order to avoid an omitted variables bias in the coefficients on the law vari-
ables. Unfortunately, there isn’t any obvious way to control for the liberalness of a state.
7States with executive orders prohibiting public employment sexual orientation discrimination are in-
cluded as states with public employment anti-discrimination legislation.
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The approach taken in this paper is to use the percentage of the states population that voted
for George Bush in the 1992 Presidential Election as a proxy for state liberalness as is done
in Haider-Markel and Meier (1996) and Gates (2007). This proxy should adequately control
for liberalness because George Bush ran a campaign based on strong family values in 1992.8
The other explanatory variables that are included in this analysis are controls for eco-
nomic opportunity, amenities, and cost of living at the origin and destination state that have
typically been found in migration studies. These variables also take on their 1994 values,
unless otherwise noted, in order to avoid issues with endogeneity. Median household income,
employment growth, and the unemployment rate are included to account for economic op-
portunity. The specification of climate amenities is based on Cushing (1987), which suggests
that extreme temperatures and other climate variables that may be correlated with tem-
perature should be included in the regression. The variables that are therefore included to
control for climate are cooling degree days, heating degree days, average wind speed, average
percent relative humidity, and average days of sunshine. Additionally, controls are included
for the non-climate amenities of the crime rate, existence of a coastline, percent of land cover
by water, cost of living, and percent of land that is a part of state parks. Table 3.4 lists and
defines all the variables used in this analysis along with the sources of those variables.
8Another variable that has been suggested to control for the attitude towards gays and lesbians is the
percent of the state population that adheres to a religion or regularly attends church. Religion is not used in
the main regression since there is ambiguity concerning which religious denominations do or do not accept
gays and lesbians. State level survey data from 1990 provided by ARDA on religious adherents is used in place
of the Bush variable in robustness checks and this variable is insignificant and its use does not significantly
change the reported results. Black et al. (2002) uses individual survey responses in the General Social Survey
to questions regarding homosexuality to control for public attitude. Unfortunately, the smallest geographic
unit that can be identified on the publicly available GSS data is the region (GSS, 2010).
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5 Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
The data on migration flows from table 3.1 can be used to gauge the appropriateness of
the gravity model in analyzing gay and lesbian migration. The states that were most often
the largest recipient of out-migrants from another state from 1995-2000 were California (13),
Florida (5), Georgia (3), Minnesota (3), Texas (4), and Washington (3). The states that were
most often the largest source of in-migrants for another state were California (13), New York
(6), Texas (5), and Massachusetts (4). From this data, population clearly plays a significant
role in gay and lesbian migration flows, but it also appears that population is not the only
determinant of migration. For example, although New York had the second largest gay and
lesbian population at the start of the period and was the largest source of in-migrants for six
states, it was not the largest recipient of in-migrants for any state. Table 3.1 also shows that
distance plays an important role in gay and lesbian migration as many of the top out-migrant
and in-migrant flows for states are with states that are in close proximity to them.
The data on net-migration in table 3.2 and on the presence of state laws in table 3.3 can
be used to develop an idea on the possible effect of gay and lesbian legislation on migration.
25% of the eight states that had passed a private employment anti-discrimination law by
1994 had a positive net-migration, while 37% of the 41 states that did not pass this legislation
experienced a positive net-migration. Also, of the 13 states that passed a public employment
anti-discrimination law, 31% had a positive net-migration, while 36% that did not pass a law
had a positive net-migration. These statistics suggest that employment anti-discrimination
laws may have a negative impact on gays and lesbians. As for the hate crime law, 44% of
the 16 states that passed a law had a positive net-migration, while 30% of the 33 states that
did not pass a law experienced a positive net-migration. This result for the hate crime law
indicates that gays and lesbians may benefit from the existence of this law. Lastly, none of
the three states that had a domestic partnership law as of 1994 had positive net-migration,
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suggesting that this law may not matter or may have a negative impact on gays and lesbians.
5.2 Main Model Specification
The direct effect results from the estimation of the spatial autoregressive Tobit model are
reported in column 2 of tables 3.5 and 3.6. The estimate for the spatial dependence coefficient
ρ is .12. Although this coefficient is relatively small, it is positive and statistically significant
indicating that there is positive spatial dependence in the gay and lesbian migration flows.
This result provides evidence that a spatial model for analyzing gay and lesbian migration
flows is superior to the non-spatial model that has been historically used to analyze migration.
The results for the coefficients of the standard gravity model variables of population and
distance are as predicted by standard gravity model theory. Distance between the origin
state and destination state has a statistically significant negative effect on the state-to-
state migration flow that decreases with distance. The coefficients on both the origin and
destination population variables are positive and statistically significant.
A feature of the remaining results is that a number of the origin and destination coef-
ficients exhibit the same sign. This result appears to be puzzling for most variables since
standard utility maximization theory suggests that variables have the opposite impact on
in-migration as they do on out-migration. The same-sign issue is not unique to this paper as
it is present in elderly migration work and multiple other migration studies. An explanation
commonly put forth concerning this issue is that asymmetries in the origin and destination
variables are likely to exist. For instance, an individual may not have full information of the
attributes of the destination or may discount the influence of variables there such as crime.
The results for the amenity variables are generally as expected. These results indicate
that gays and lesbians migrate into places that are not extremely cold, that have a coastline,
and that are more liberal. They migrate away from places that are extremely cold and have
high average wind speeds. The one result that goes against expectations is that an increase
in percentage sunshine leads to an increase in out-migration. This result might be explained
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by collinearity with the cooling degree days variables which have the expected signs but are
statistically insignificant. Neither the origin or destination variables for the percentage of
land covered by water, percentage of land devoted to state parks, crime rate, humidity, cost
of living, or cooling degree days have statistically significant coefficients, suggesting these
amenities do not factor into the utility of gays and lesbians.
As for the economic opportunity variables, the unemployment rate appears to be the
most important of these variables influencing gay and lesbian migration. Specifically, an
increase in the unemployment rate causes a decrease in in-migration to a state. Employment
growth leads to an increase in in-migration as expected, but also causes an increase in out-
migration. This same-sign issue for employment growth can likely be explained by places
with high employment growth being vibrant places with people often moving in and out.
The coefficients on both the origin and destination median household income variables are
statistically insignificant. This indicates that after controlling for amenities and cost of living
median household income does not factor into gay and lesbian migration.
The coefficients mainly of interest are those on the legislation variables. The evidence
suggests that the existence of a private employment anti-discrimination law does not have
an impact on out-migration, but causes a reduction in in-migration. This result indicates
that a private employment anti-discrimination law has a negative impact on gay and lesbian
employment outcomes that outweighs any positive effect that might exist from the existence
of the law. As for the public employment anti-discrimination and hate crime laws, the
existence of these laws also do not have an impact on out-migration, but result in an increase
in-migration. These results suggest that gays and lesbians gain utility from living in places
that have passed a public employment anti-discrimination or a hate crime law. Lastly, it is
found that the existence of a domestic partnership does not have an impact on in-migration
or out-migration, indicating that this law may not have an effect on the utility of gays and
lesbians.
For comparison, reported in column 1 of tables 3.5 and 3.6 are the results from the estima-
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tion of the Tobit model excluding the spatial weight matrix. The statistical significance and
sign of the legislation coefficients is unchanged between the two models, with the exception
of the hate crime in-migration law becoming statistically significant at the 5% significance
level. A priori, the magnitude of the coefficients for the law variables of the spatial model
could be greater or less than those of the non-spatial model. The coefficients are expected to
be less than those of the non-spatial model because the non-spatial model attributes some
of the spatial correlation in migration flows to the presence of laws. On the other hand,
the spatial model coefficients include not only the initial impact of a change in a law on a
migration flow, but also the feedback that occurs when that migration flow impacts other
migration flows that then feed back onto the initial flow. In looking at the statistically signif-
icant coefficients on the law variables, the coefficient on the non-spatial private employment
anti-discrimination in-migration variable is higher (in absolute value), the coefficient on the
non-spatial public employment anti-discrimination in-migration variable is higher, and the
coefficient on the non-spatial hate crime variable is approximately the same as the spatial
coefficient.
5.3 Checks for Robustness
One possible issue with the results reported up to this point is that only states with a
particular law as of 1994 have been considered as having that law in existence. The possibility
exists that laws passed at the beginning of the migration period could also significantly
influence migration decisions over the time period. The reason for this is that a number of
the migration moves are likely to of occurred in years after the beginning of the migration
period, in which case those migrants would be basing their decisions on laws passed in the
year 1995 or 1996. Therefore, the model is re-estimated first using 1995 as the cutoff year
for legislation and then using 1996 as the cutoff year to check for robustness of the results.
In column 3 of tables 3.5 and 3.6 coefficients are reported for the estimation of the model
using 1995 as the cutoff year, and in column 4 coefficients are reported for estimation of
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the model using 1996 as the cutoff year. For the most part, the results for the legislation
variables are similar to the results obtained when 1994 is used as the cutoff year. The one
major change when 1995 or 1996 is used as the cutoff year is that the private employment
anti-discrimination law is now indicated as reducing out-migration from a state. Therefore,
the coefficient on this variable now exhibits the same-sign issue as it also indicates that a
private employment law decreases in-migration to a state. This phenomenon can likely be
explained by two competing influences on gays and lesbians. For one, they may see the law
as being a positive protection of their rights and gain utility from the existence of the law
in itself. At the same time, it is harder for them to find employment in a state because of
the existence of a law and this makes it less likely for them to move there.
Another possible issue is that legislation targeted towards gays and lesbians may have a
different effect on gays than on lesbians. Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) provides evidence that
gays face labor market discrimination and that lesbians do not. Also, results from Herek
(2009) show that gays are likelier to have hate crimes committed against them than lesbians
are. Additionally, chapter 2 of this dissertation provides evidence that the passage of a
private employment anti-discrimination law reduces employment and raises wages for gays
and it does not have an effect on labor market outcomes for lesbians. In order to account for
this possibility, the sample is separated into separate gay and lesbian migration flows and is
re-estimated for both of these samples.
Separate results for the gay and lesbian samples are reported in tables 3.7 and 3.8.
The results are reported using 1994, 1995, and 1996 as the cutoff year for legislation. For
both the gay and lesbian samples, the private employment anti-discrimination law reduces
in-migration for all three cutoff year specifications. Also, a hate crime law increases in-
migration in all specifications, with the exception of the 1994 cutoff year for the gay sample.
The finding that lesbians are negatively impacted by private employment anti-discrimination
laws in addition to gays doesn’t seem to match with previous research, but these laws are
often passed along with other anti-discrimination measures that could negatively impact
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lesbians in similar fashion as the private employment laws do for gays.
One other possible issue is that only state level laws have been considered up to this point.
As of 1994, local governments had also passed legislation in regards to domestic partnerships
and public and private employment discrimination. There are two main reasons for only
considering state laws and ignoring local gay and lesbian rights legislation. One reason is
that local laws vary widely from place to place in their enforceability based on, and this
enforceability is not revealed through the data on the existence of these laws. Also, the
survey results suggesting that gays and lesbians lack knowledge on basic gay and lesbian
rights legislation at the national and state levels would seem to also suggest that they would
be even more likely to lack knowledge on the often less publicized local laws. However, there
is the possibility that local legislation that has been relegated to the error term has an effect
on gays and lesbians and is therefore impacting the results that have been reported so far.
The problem that arises is finding a way to incorporate local legislation into a state-to-
state migration flows model. The method that is used in Haider-Markel and Meier (1996)
to incorporate local legislation into a state level model of legislation adoption is to use the
percentage of the state’s population that is covered by either a local or state law as the
legislation variable. This variable represents the probability of an individual being covered
by a particular law by residing in a state. The three gay and lesbian rights laws that vary
at the local level and that are constructed in this way are the private employment anti-
discrimination, public employment anti-discrimination, and domestic partnership law. Hate
crime laws only vary at the state level and are kept as a binary variable representing if a
state had a hate crime law or not.
The results for the re-estimation of the model using this new specification of the legislation
variables is reported in tables 3.9 and 3.10 for the full, gay, and lesbian samples. The results
for the coefficient sign and statistical significance of the private employment in-migration and
hate crime law in-migration variables are similar to those results in the state laws regressions.
As for domestic partnership laws, they vary much more at the local than at the state level of
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government, so it might be expected that if these laws matter to gays and lesbians then this
might show up when information on local laws is included into the analysis. Despite this,
the coefficients on both the in-migration and out-migration domestic partnership variables
continue to be statistically insignificant.
6 Conclusion
The results of this chapter provide evidence that the passage of certain types of gay and
lesbian rights legislation do have an impact on the utility of gays and lesbians. The estimation
of the main model specification using 1994 as the cutoff year for the passage of legislation
shows that public employment anti-discrimination laws and hate crime laws increase in-
migration, while private employment anti-discrimination laws decrease in-migration. These
results indicate that gays and lesbians are made better off as the result of the passage of
public employment anti-discrimination and hate crime laws, and that they are made worse
off by the passage of private employment anti-discrimination laws. Robustness checks that
switch the cutoff year for the data on the passage of legislation to 1995 and 1996 suggest
that private employment laws may also have a negative impact on out-migration, which
suggest that gays and lesbians actually benefit from these laws. This same-sign issue with
the private employment law can likely be explained by the law having a negative impact on
gay and lesbian employment outcomes while at the same time benefiting them as they feel
more welcomed in these places.
These results have significance at the federal level of government. For one, they suggest
that the recently passed federal law including sexual orientation into the national hate crimes
law has increased the utility of gays and lesbians. The results also indicate that the effect
of the passage of the federal private sector anti-discrimination law that is being currently
considered in Congress is not clear. The evidence provided on the impact of private employ-
ment anti-discrimination on the employment of gays provided in the last chapter, and on the
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impact of this law on in-migration provided in this chapter, suggest a negative effect of this
law on gays and lesbians. The possible reduction in out-migration also found in this chap-
ter, as well as the increases in wages for gays found in the last chapter, indicate a positive
impact of this legislation. What these results do suggest is that a more in depth discussion
and further research needs to take place before this legislation is passed at the federal level.
These results also have policy implications for states that may want to pass legislation in
order to attract gays and lesbians for economic growth purposes. In particular, the findings
of this chapter unambiguously indicate that states that want to attract gays and lesbians
should pass public employment anti-discrimination laws. This finding is important as there
are likely to be large changes in gay and lesbian populations at stake with the passage or non-
passage of legislation. Estimates of the total homosexual population from previous studies
range from 4% to 10% of the overall population, and the homosexual population is likely
to be relatively mobile as these individuals are less likely constrained by children and other
family obligations.
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Table 3.1: Source and Magnitude of Top Gay and Lesbian Migrant In-flow and Out-Flow By State
State Population Top Out Flow To: Flow Size Top In Flow From: Flow Size
Alabama 11604 Florida 277 Georgia 271
Arizona 17419 California 936 California 728
Arkansas 5080 Texas 306 California 145
California 151615 Washington 1723 New York 1644
Colorado 16679 California 545 Texas 467
Connecticut 11780 Florida 253 New York 336
Delaware 2164 Maryland 145 Pennsylvania 240
District of Columbia 5865 Virginia 479 Maryland 509
Florida 54980 Georgia 1220 New York 1413
Georgia 30051 Florida 591 Florida 1220
Idaho 3053 Washington 87 Nevada 90
Illinois 35508 California 768 California 576
Indiana 17617 Kentucky 364 Illinois 288
Iowa 6495 California 161 Minnesota 150
Kansas 6399 Missouri 249 Missouri 327
Kentucky 9594 Ohio 240 Indiana 364
Louisiana 15567 Texas 348 Mississippi 175
Maine 4601 Florida 143 Massachusetts 288
Maryland 18155 DC 509 Virginia 487
Massachusetts 29121 California 631 New York 520
Michigan 24212 California 310 California 279
Minnesota 14296 California 277 Wisconsin 440
Mississippi 7428 Tennessee 207 California 134
Missouri 15361 Kansas 327 Kansas 249
Montana 2690 California 219 Texas 48
Nebraska 4211 Colorado 133 Iowa 132
Nevada 6578 California 205 California 1356
New Hampshire 5054 Massachusetts 272 Massachusetts 278
New Jersey 25941 Pennsylvania 857 New York 1243
New Mexico 6186 Texas 243 California 152
New York 75805 California 1644 California 888
North Carolina 24931 Georgia 617 New York 683
North Dakota 927 Minnesota 71 Minnesota 97
Ohio 30631 Florida 622 Michigan 262
Oklahoma 8020 Texas 387 Texas 344
Oregon 14248 Washington 473 California 615
Pennsylvania 34470 New Jersey 647 New Jersey 857
Rhode Island 4263 Massachusetts 280 Massachusetts 173
South Carolina 11658 Georgia 291 North Carolina 222
South Dakota 1303 Minnesota 285 Nebraska 69
Tennessee 15720 Kentucky 218 Texas 337
Texas 66297 California 1087 California 1025
Utah 5460 California 229 California 200
Vermont 3456 New Hampshire 109 Massachusetts 164
Virginia 23069 Maryland 487 DC 479
Washington 25494 California 554 California 1723
West Virginia 5425 Virginia 137 California 73
Wisconsin 14262 Minnesota 440 Illinois 285
Wyoming 1212 Colorado 120 Texas 49
a Gay and lesbian population and migration flows are calculated from the 5% PUMS of the 2000
Census. The 5% PUMS of the 2000 Census is available from www.ipums.org.
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Table 3.2: Out, In, and Net Gay and Lesbian Migration by State
State Population Out-Migrants In-Migrants Net-Migrants
Alabama 11604 1456 1452 -4
Arizona 17419 2348 4215 1867
Arkansas 5080 951 902 -49
California 151615 12961 12944 -17
Colorado 16679 2317 3632 1315
Connecticut 11780 1326 1364 38
Delaware 2164 327 813 486
District of Columbia 5865 1916 1479 -437
Florida 54980 6362 9564 3202
Georgia 30051 3938 6281 2343
Idaho 3053 494 390 -104
Illinois 35508 4367 3766 -601
Indiana 17617 2421 1750 -671
Iowa 6495 1084 633 -451
Kansas 6399 1188 1487 299
Kentucky 9594 1203 1715 512
Louisiana 15567 2022 1320 -702
Maine 4601 762 1136 374
Maryland 18155 2811 2645 -166
Massachusetts 29121 4330 3349 -981
Michigan 24212 2585 2117 -468
Minnesota 14296 1805 2403 598
Mississippi 7428 852 819 -33
Missouri 15361 2347 1528 -819
Montana 2690 806 215 -591
Nebraska 4211 882 432 -450
Nevada 6578 975 2532 1557
New Hampshire 5054 928 672 -256
New Jersey 25941 3733 3060 -673
New Mexico 6186 1058 936 -122
New York 75805 9473 5979 -3494
North Carolina 24931 2951 4044 1093
North Dakota 927 155 107 -48
Ohio 30631 4402 2489 -1913
Oklahoma 8020 1513 1146 -367
Oregon 14248 1800 2416 616
Pennsylvania 34470 3682 2985 -697
Rhode Island 4263 838 565 -273
South Carolina 11658 1474 1260 -214
South Dakota 1303 197 277 80
Tennessee 15720 2257 2723 466
Texas 66297 7007 7290 283
Utah 5460 867 859 -8
Vermont 3456 551 505 -46
Virginia 23069 4328 3280 -1048
Washington 25494 2941 4757 1816
West Virginia 5425 658 123 -535
Wisconsin 14262 1799 1266 -533
Wyoming 1212 403 229 -174
a Gay and lesbian population and migration flows are calculated from the 5%
PUMS of the 2000 Census. The 5% PUMS of the 2000 Census is available from
www.ipums.org.
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Table 3.3: Year of Passage of Legislation for States With a Law as of
1996
State Private Public Hate Crime Partnership
Alabama x x x x
Arizona x x x x
Arkansas x x x x
California 1990 1979 1984 x
Colorado 1990 x x
Connecticut 1991 1991 1987 x
Delaware x x 1995 x
District of Columbia 1991 1977 1977 1992
Florida x x 1991 x
Georgia x x x x
Idaho x x x x
Illinois x 1996 1990 x
Indiana x x x x
Iowa x x 1990 x
Kansas x x x x
Kentucky x x x x
Louisiana x x x x
Maine x x 1987 x
Maryland x 1995 x x
Massachusetts 1989 1989 1996 1992
Michigan x x x x
Minnesota 1993 1993 1988 x
Mississippi x x x x
Missouri x x x x
Montana x x x x
Nebraska x x x x
Nevada x x 1989 x
New Hampshire x x 1990 x
New Jersey 1992 1992 1990 x
New Mexico x x x x
New York x 1994 x x
North Carolina x x x x
North Dakota x x x x
Ohio x 1992 x x
Oklahoma x x x x
Oregon x x 1989 x
Pennsylvania x 1988 x x
Rhode Island 1995 1995 1991 x
South Carolina x x x x
South Dakota x x x x
Tennessee x x x x
Texas x x x x
Utah x x x x
Vermont 1993 1993 1990 1991
Virginia x x x x
Washington x 1985 1993 x
West Virginia x x x x
Wisconsin 1978 1978 1988 x
Wyoming x x x x
a Years in bold represent laws passed as of 1994. These are the laws
used in the main regression specification. The data on laws is from
NGLTF (1998) and Rimmerman et al., eds (2000).
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Table 3.4: Definition and Source of Variables
Variable Definition Source
Migration Flow origin to destination state migration flow Author’s Calculation from
of gays and lesbians between 1995-2000 2000 U.S. Census 5% PUMS
Distance distance in hundreds of miles between the geographic Author’s Calculation
center of each origin and destination state Using MATLAB 7.10.0
Population estimate of gay and lesbian population at Author’s Calculation from
the beginning of the migration period 2000 U.S. Census 5% PUMS
Employment Growth percentage change in Statistical Abstract of the
employment from 1990 to 1994 United States
Income median household income in 1994 Statistical Abstract of the
United States
Unemployment unemployment rate in 1994 Statistical Abstract of the
United States
Crime Rate number of crimes committed Statistical Abstract of the
per 100,000 people in 1994 United States
Cooling population weighted average number of National Oceanic and
annual cooling degree days Atmosphere Administration
Heating population weighted average number of National Oceanic and
annual heating degree days Atmosphere Administration
Sunshine average percentage days of Statistical Abstract of the
sunshine annually United States
Wind annual average wind speed in miles per hour Statistical Abstract of the
United States
Humidity annual average percent relative humidity Statistical Abstract of the
United States
Water Cover percent of state land covered by lakes and rivers Statistical Abstract of the
United States
State Park percent of state land that is part of a state park Statistical Abstract of the
United States
Cost of Living cost of living index created by (CITE) for 1990 CITE and
and adjusted for 1994 using the state GDP deflator Bureau of Labor Statistics
Coastline binary variable equaling one if there Statistical Abstract of the
is an ocean or Great Lake coastline United States
Bush Vote percentage of the state vote that George Bush www.uselectionatlas.org
received in the 1992 President election
Private Law binary variable equaling on if the state had a private NGLTF Policy Institute
employment anti-discrimination law as of the cutoff year
Hate Crime Law binary variable equaling one if the state had a NGLTF Policy Institute
hate crime law as of the cutoff year
Partnership Law binary variable equaling one if the state had a NGLTF Policy Institute
domestic partnership law as of the cutoff year
Public Law binary variable equaling one if the state had a public NGLTF Policy Institute
employment anti-discrimination law as of the cutoff year
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Table 3.5: Full Sample Bayesian Spatial Autoregressive Tobit Model Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Spatial 1994 Cutoff 1995 Cutoff 1996 Cutoff
Stayer -27.86*** -27.69*** -32.07*** -31.02***
(5.44) (-5.64) (-6.43) (-6.20)
Mover -32.24*** -32.43*** -36.83*** -35.75***
(5.46) (-6.68) (-7.42) (-7.15)
Distance -0.7919*** -0.6604*** -0.6653*** -0.6660***
(0.0470) (-12.92) (-12.67) (-14.02)
Distance Squared 0.0248*** 0.0212*** 0.0213*** 0.0213***
(0.0020) (10.40) (10.13) (11.31)
Log Population O 1.96*** 1.83*** 1.92*** 1.95***
(0.1330) (14.37) (14.37) (14.66)
Log Population D 1.78*** 1.37*** 1.54*** 1.53***
(0.1331) (10.61) (11.81) (11.45)
Cooling O 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (1.31) (0.73) (0.74)
Cooling D -0.0004** -0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0004**
(0.0002) (-1.49) (-1.88) (-1.96)
Heating O 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0003**
(0.0001) (2.29) (2.29) (2.23)
Heating D -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (-3.04) (-3.00) (-2.89)
Wind O 0.1708*** 0.1812*** 0.2082*** 0.1980***
(0.05680) (3.19) (3.52) (3.20)
Wind D 0.0300 0.0706 0.1035* 0.0837
(0.0602) (1.23) (1.75) (1.42)
Sunshine O 0.0464*** 0.0485*** 0.0548*** 0.0498***
(0.0187) (2.80) (2.97) (2.65)
Sunshine D 0.0397** 0.0403** 0.0494*** 0.0437**
(0.0189) (2.28) (2.69) (2.39)
Humidity O 0.0159 0.0150 0.0178 0.0143
(0.0193) (0.83) (0.94) (0.77)
Humidity D -0.0278* -0.0202 -0.0183 -0.0216
(0.0192) (-1.13) (-1.01) (-1.18)
Coastline O -0.2444 -0.1666 -0.2497 -0.2689
(0.2690) (-0.61) (-0.92) (-0.89)
Coastline D 0.6680*** 0.61370** 0.4602* 0.3763
(0.2795) (2.26) (1.68) (1.37)
Water Cover O 0.0109 0.0165 0.0554 0.0565
(0.0373) (0.45) (1.40) (1.40)
Water Cover D 0.0143 0.0104 0.0556 0.0580
(0.0387) (0.30) (1.37) (1.51)
State Park O 0.0045 -0.0212 -0.0416 -0.0469
(0.0914) (-0.23) (-0.47) (-0.51)
State Park D 0.01420 -0.0249 -0.0850 -0.1176
(0.0866) (-0.29) (-0.98) (-1.27)
a Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
b Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis for the the non-spatial Tobit model.
c T-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the spatial Tobit models.
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 3.6: (Continued):Full Sample Bayesian Spatial Autoregressive Tobit Model Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Spatial 1994 Cutoff 1995 Cutoff 1996 Cutoff
Crime Rate O 0.00007 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00000
(0.00009) (0.23) (-0.17) (0.03)
Crime Rate D 0.00008 0.00009 0.00002 0.00004
(0.00009) (0.99) (0.26) (0.49)
Bush Vote O -0.0208 -0.0158 -0.0140 -0.0180
(0.0280) (-0.57) (-0.50) (-0.63)
Bush Vote D -0.0911*** -0.0603** -0.0470* -0.0443
(0.0283) (-2.14) (-1.65) (-1.50)
Cost of Living O 0.0098 0.0193 0.0164 0.0146
(0.0197) (1.01) (0.87) (0.78)
Cost of Living D 0.0083 0.0029 0.0004 0.0014
(0.0212) (0.15) (0.02) (0.08)
Employment Growth O 0.0802*** 0.0838** 0.0941*** 0.0833**
(0.0338) (2.50) (2.65) (2.34)
Employment Growth D 0.1528*** 0.1100*** 0.1275*** 0.1171***
(0.0343) (3.33) (3.88) (3.33)
Unemployment O 0.0099 0.0261 0.0706* 0.0648
(0.0969) (0.28) (0.74) (0.66)
Unemployment D -0.3690*** -0.2557*** -0.1823* -0.1834*
(0.1019) (-2.77) (-1.95) (-1.90)
Income O -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001
(0.00004) (-0.53) (-0.42) (-0.26)
Income D 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
(0.00004) (0.29) (0.17) (0.27)
Partnership Law O -0.5554 -0.3115 -0.0647 -0.2766
(0.5029) (-0.67) (-0.13) (-0.58)
Partnership Law D -0.1664 -0.0964 0.5362 0.0960
(0.4938) (-0.21) (1.07) (0.21)
Hate Crime Law O 0.0922 0.2031 0.2789 0.2412
(0.2411) (0.84) (1.10) (0.99)
Hate Crime Law D 0.4150** 0.4228* 0.6821*** 0.6435**
(0.2476) (1.81) (2.67) (2.55)
Public Law O 0.1233 0.1123 0.0443 -0.2003
(0.2806) (0.39) (0.16) (-0.71)
Public Law D 0.6587** 0.5435** 0.5121** 0.4080
(0.2834) (1.99) (2.06) (1.43)
Private Law O -0.2869 -0.5282 -0.7853** -0.6429*
(0.3838) (-1.45) (-2.09) (-1.84)
Private Law D -0.9007** -0.7856** -1.1790*** -0.9896***
(0.3815) (-2.15) (-3.25) (-2.87)
Rho 0.1240*** 0.1211*** 0.1211***
a Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
b Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis for the the non-spatial Tobit model.
c T-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the spatial Tobit models.
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Table 3.7: Bayesian Spatial Autoregressive Tobit Model Estimation Results for Separate Gay and Lesbian Samples
Gays Lesbians
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994 Cutoff 1995 Cutoff 1996 Cutoff 1994 Cutoff 1995 Cutoff 1996 Cutoff
Stayer -42.59*** -47.06*** -46.64*** -24.47*** -26.54*** -25.46***
(-6.58) (-6.98) (-7.15) (-3.49) (-4.16) (-4.11)
Mover -48.35*** -52.75*** -52.36*** -29.64*** -31.66*** -30.56***
(-7.50) (-7.87) (-8.04) (-4.26) (-4.96) (-4.97)
Distance -0.6754*** -0.6872*** -0.6862*** -0.8537*** -0.8604*** -0.8576***
(-10.41) (-10.78) (-10.98) (-14.53) (-13.47) (-13.31)
Distance Squared 0.0205*** 0.0208*** 0.0206*** 0.0279*** 0.0282*** 0.0280***
(7.67) (8.04) (8.26) (11.50) (10.88) (10.72)
Log Population O 1.78*** 1.83*** 1.86*** 1.92*** 1.98*** 2.02***
(9.82) (10.71) (10.23) (11.17) (11.67) (11.40)
Log Population D 1.61*** 1.82*** 1.78*** 1.69*** 1.86*** 1.84***
(9.32) (10.52) (10.69) (10.23) (11.31) (10.94)
Cooling O 0.0006** 0.0005 0.0005* -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
(1.97) (1.62) (1.85) (-0.06) (-0.17) (-0.31)
Cooling D -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005** -0.0008*** -0.0007***
(-0.09) (-0.66) (-0.69) (-2.08) (-2.77) (-2.64)
Heating O 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(1.92) (1.81) (2.21) (0.54) (0.62) (0.57)
Heating D -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004***
(-0.95) (-0.85) (-0.84) (-2.80) (-3.21) (-3.24)
Wind O 0.2255*** 0.2378*** 0.2249*** 0.2153*** 0.2375*** 0.2291***
(3.13) (3.02) (2.91) (2.89) (2.96) (2.85)
Wind D 0.0918 0.1402* 0.1125 0.07356 0.1169 0.0710
(1.19) (1.79) (1.53) (0.93) (1.55) (0.96)
Sunshine O 0.0281 0.0337 0.0301 0.0534** 0.0583** 0.0530**
(1.20) (1.42) (1.22) (2.25) (2.46) (2.21)
Sunshine D 0.0429* 0.0583** 0.0500** 0.0539** 0.0599** 0.0532**
(1.81) (2.54) (2.24) (2.29) (2.56) (2.36)
Humidity O -0.0126 -0.0096 -0.0093 0.0376 0.0420* 0.0369
(-0.51) (-0.41) (-0.38) (1.52) (1.77) (1.46)
Humidity D -0.0131 -0.0084 -0.0123 -0.0339 -0.0412* -0.0419*
(-0.57) (-0.36) (-0.55) (-1.46) (-1.77) (-1.86)
Coastline O -0.2566 -0.3663 -0.3639 0.1804 0.1462 0.1274
(-0.68) (-1.04) (-0.91) (0.51) (0.41) (0.34)
Coastline D 0.5286 0.3606 0.2337 0.8400** 0.6702** 0.5026
(1.48) (1.00) (0.64) (2.40) (1.97) (1.34)
Water Cover O 0.0209 0.0497 0.0414 -0.0335 -0.0051 -0.0020
(0.41) (1.04) (0.78) (-0.72) (-0.10) (-0.04)
Water Cover D 0.0079 0.0569 0.0664 0.0348 0.0978** 0.0983*
(0.17) (1.10) (1.36) (0.76) (2.04) (2.07)
State Park O -0.1828 -0.1862 -0.1874 0.0373 -0.0028 0.0113
(-1.56) (-1.64) (-1.53) (0.33) (-0.02) (0.10)
State Park D -0.1347 -0.1977* -0.2523** 0.1027 0.0241 -0.0308
(-1.17) (-1.72) (-2.14) (0.85) (0.21) (-0.26)
a Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
b T-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the spatial Tobit models.
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 3.8: (Continued): Bayesian Spatial Autoregressive Tobit Model Estimation Results for Separate Gay and Lesbian Samples
Gays Lesbians
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994 Cutoff 1995 Cutoff 1996 Cutoff 1994 Cutoff 1995 Cutoff 1996 Cutoff
Crime Rate O -0.00005 -0.00007 -0.00003 0.00004 0.00000 0.00000
(-0.47) (-0.60) (-0.28) (0.40) (-0.00) (0.00)
Crime Rate D 0.00023** 0.00015 0.00019 -0.00002 -0.00007 -0.00004
(2.02) (1.26) (1.60) (-0.13) (-0.66) (-0.39
Bush Vote O 0.0075 0.0106 0.0024 -0.0552 -0.0619* -0.0646*
(0.21) (0.27) (0.06) (-1.64) (-1.75) (-1.68)
Bush Vote D -0.0201 -0.0064 0.0058 -0.0923*** -0.0764** -0.0702*
(-0.56) (-0.17) (0.15) (-2.63) (-2.16) (-1.88)
Cost of Living O 0.0338 0.0252 0.0249 0.0118 0.0124 0.0100
(1.43) (1.05) (0.96) (0.47) (0.53) (0.41)
Cost of Living D 0.0405 0.0366 0.03880 -0.0214 -0.0353 -0.0340
(1.64) (1.49) (1.57) (-0.84) (-1.53) (-1.47)
Employment Growth O 0.10070** 0.0976** 0.0850* 0.0988** 0.1143** 0.1080**
(2.33) (2.32) (1.75) (2.23) (2.58) (2.46)
Employment Growth D 0.1673*** 0.1871*** 0.1746*** 0.1066** 0.1080** 0.0892**
(4.05) (4.01) (3.77) (2.40) (2.49) (1.99)
Unemployment O 0.3562*** 0.3891*** 0.3863*** -0.1634 -0.1245 -0.1241
(2.82) (3.20) (3.04) (-1.32) (-0.96) (-1.00)
Unemployment D -0.0683 0.0158 0.0277 -0.3853*** -0.3278*** -0.3235**
(-0.54) (0.13) (0.22) (-3.03) (-2.72) (-2.51)
Income O 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001
(0.09) (0.27) (0.44) (0.00) (0.12) (0.21)
Income D 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001
(0.58) (0.50) (0.52) (0.04) (0.07) (0.19)
Partnership Law O -0.2936 -0.0723 -0.4651 -0.1947 -0.0815 -0.1416
(-0.49) (-0.11) (-0.79) (-0.32) (-0.13) (-0.23)
Partnership Law D -0.3368 0.4853 -0.0188 0.5219 1.0249 0.4838
(-0.53) (0.72) (-0.03) (0.84) (1.62) (0.85)
Hate Crime Law O 0.3462 0.4394 0.3687 0.0181 -0.0150 0.0094
(1.13) (1.28) (1.09) (0.06) (-0.05) (0.03)
Hate Crime Law D 0.4768 0.8658*** 0.7928** 0.6394** 0.9633*** 0.9646***
(1.49) (2.60) (2.35) (2.17) (3.00) (3.01)
Public Law O -0.2008 -0.1499 -0.4718 0.2645 0.1234 -0.1655
(-0.55) (-0.43) (-1.33) (0.70) (0.37) (-0.47)
Public Law D 0.5724* 0.5475 0.5666 0.2981 0.2656 0.1918
(1.67) (1.60) (1.52) (0.82) (0.82) (0.55)
Private Law O -0.2039 -0.4642 -0.2866 -0.6412 -0.7142 -0.5789
(-0.42) (-1.00) (-0.63) (-1.30) (-1.57) (-1.36)
Private Law D -0.9191** -1.5433*** -1.3429*** -1.1113** -1.3282*** -1.1754***
(-2.02) (-3.33) (-3.07) (-2.27) (-2.90) (-2.78)
rho 0.1010*** 0.0951*** 0.0968*** 0.0651** 0.0626** 0.0595**
a Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
b T-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the spatial Tobit models.
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Table 3.9: Bayesian Spatial Autoregressive Tobit Model Estimation Results In-
cluding Local Laws as of 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Spatial Full Gays Lesbians
Stayer -32.38*** -31.23*** -46.91*** -27.87***
(5.60) (-5.93) (-7.05) (-4.27)
Mover -36.76*** -35.96*** -52.67*** -33.02***
(5.54) (-6.88) (-7.91) (-5.09)
Distance -0.7950*** -0.6663*** -0.6856*** -0.8543***
(0.0497) (-12.82) (-10.27) (-13.93)
Distance Squared 0.0249*** 0.0214*** 0.0207*** 0.0279***
(0.0021) (10.28) (7.74) (11.08)
Log Population O 2.07*** 1.93*** 1.88*** 2.02***
(0.1377) (14.09) (11.28) (11.91)
Log Population D 1.84*** 1.42*** 1.68*** 1.75***
(0.1289) (11.10) (9.20) (10.80)
Cooling O 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006** 0.0000
(0.0002) (1.20) (2.06) (0.11)
Cooling D -0.0004** -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0005
(0.0002) (-1.29) (0.03) (-1.55)
Heating O 0.0003** 0.0003*** 0.0004** 0.0002
(0.0001) (2.70) (2.37) (0.97)
Heating D -0.0004*** -0.0003** -0.0001 -0.0003**
(0.0001) (-2.56) (-0.50) (-2.10)
Wind O 0.1708*** 0.1791*** 0.2270*** 0.2206***
(0.0641) (3.01) (2.92) (2.69)
Wind D 0.0170 0.0613 0.0870 0.0560
(0.0624) (1.07) (1.07) (0.72)
Sunshine O 0.0490*** 0.0507*** 0.0330 0.0529**
(0.0198) (2.81) (1.46) (2.13)
Sunshine D 0.0438*** 0.0431** 0.0461* 0.0579***
(0.01922) (2.37) (1.92) (2.44)
Humidity O 0.0192 0.0185 -0.0081 0.0423**
(0.0212) (0.95) (-0.33) (1.76)
Humidity D -0.0204 -0.0160 -0.0080 -0.0287
(0.0194) (-0.89) (-0.31) (-1.19)
Coastline O -0.2862 -0.1631 -0.2679 0.1392
(0.2925) (-0.59) (-0.79) (0.41)
Coastline D 0.6608*** 0.6228** 0.5633 0.8416**
(0.2910) (2.40) (1.56) (2.41)
Water Cover O 0.0138 0.0098 0.0084 -0.0358
(0.0402) (0.25) (0.17) (-0.74)
Water Cover D 0.0103 0.0087 -0.0021 0.0299
(0.0377) (0.25) (-0.04) (0.65)
State Park O 0.0212 0.0024 -0.1430 0.0537
(0.0944) (0.02) (-1.21) (0.45)
State Park D -0.0045 -0.0292 -0.1583 0.1070
(0.0944) (-0.32) (-1.35) (0.87)
a Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
b Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis for the non-spatial Tobit model.
c T-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the spatial Tobit models.
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Table 3.10: (Continued): Bayesian Spatial Autoregressive Tobit Model Estimation Re-
sults Including Local Laws as of 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Spatial Full Gays Lesbians
Crime Rate O 0.00009 0.00006 -0.00002 0.00006
(0.00009) (0.73) (-0.13) (0.54)
Crime Rate D 0.00008 0.00009 0.00025** 0.00001
(0.00009) (1.07) (2.27) (0.10)
Bush Vote O -0.0140 -0.0111 0.0110 -0.0568*
(0.0277) (-0.42) (0.31) (-1.70)
Bush Vote D -0.0830*** -0.0543** -0.0047 -0.0900***
(0.0284) (-2.01) (-0.13) (-2.63)
Cost of Living O 0.0115 0.0191 0.0307 0.0155
(0.0197) (0.99) (1.21) (0.61)
Cost of Living D 0.0077 0.0036 0.0403 -0.0263
(0.0202) (0.19) (1.60) (-1.06)
Employment Growth O 0.0769** 0.0801** 0.0942** 0.1024**
(0.0347) (2.42) (2.15) (2.30)
Employment Growth D 0.1500 0.1108*** 0.1624*** 0.0936**
(0.0341) (3.38) (3.82) (2.26)
Unemployment O 0.0346 0.0437 0.3832*** -0.1372
(0.0999) (0.44) (3.15) (-1.07)
Unemployment D -0.3412** -0.2392** -0.0569 -0.3934***
(0.1044) (-2.51) (-0.45) (-3.15)
Income O -0.00002 -0.00002 0.00001 0.00000
(0.00004) (-0.55) (0.18) (0.00)
Income D 0.00001 0.00001 0.00003 0.00001
(0.00004) (0.23) (0.56) (0.13)
Partnership Law O -0.0025 0.0005 0.0013 -0.0011
(0.0050) (0.10) (0.21) (-0.17)
Partnership Law D 0.0032 0.0027 0.0021 0.0082
(0.0051) (0.58) (0.34) (1.35)
Hate Crime Law O 0.1855 0.2876 0.4852* 0.0360
(0.2329) (1.21) (1.66) (0.13)
Hate Crime Law D 0.4821** 0.4566** 0.5614* 0.6741***
(0.2420) (2.08) (1.85) (2.36)
Public Law O 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0029 0.0017
(0.0035) (0.01) (-0.63) (0.38)
Public Law D 0.0078** 0.0064* 0.0074* 0.0030
(0.0036) (1.93) (1.68) (0.68)
Private Law O -0.0066* -0.0087* -0.0067 -0.0093
(0.0047) (-1.94) (-1.12) (-1.62)
Private Law D -0.0118*** -0.0101** -0.0115** -0.0133**
(0.0050) (-2.27) (-2.02) (-2.32)
rho 0.1232*** 0.0984*** 0.0659**
a Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
b Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis for the non-spatial Tobit model.
c T-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the spatial Tobit models.
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Chapter 4
An Examination of Prejudice Against
Gay and Lesbian Households: A
Spatial Hedonic Approach
1 Introduction
The passage of different types of gay and lesbian rights legislation at the local, state, and
federal levels of government has been a topic of heated debate in recent years. The argument
that is often made against the passage of legislation that prohibits employment and other
types of market discrimination against gays and lesbians is that gays and lesbians are not
discriminated against by society. Thus, the passage of anti-discrimination legislation only
serves the function of extending special privileges to them. Additionally, the case that is
often made against allowing gays and lesbians to marry is that by providing this right to
them the institution of marriage is ruined. By ruining this institution and thereby causing
a breakdown in the traditional family unit, allowing gays and lesbians to marry leads to
increases in divorce, abortion rates, the proportion of children born to single women, and
the percent of children in female headed households in society.
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Research examining these claims often made against the passage of legislation provides
evidence that these claims are likely not to be true. Evidence pointing towards the existence
of discrimination is provided by Herek (2009), which shows using survey data that gays
and lesbians at least perceive themselves as being targets of hate crimes. Also, Tebaldi
and Elmslie (2006) and Allegretto and Arthur (2001) provide evidence that gays face labor
market discrimination, and results from Badgett (1995) indicate that both gays and lesbians
are subject to labor market discrimination. Additionally, (Langbein and Yost Jr., 2009) finds
no statistically significant adverse effect on society in states that allow gays and lesbians to
marry.
Thus, the possibility exists that claims made against passing gay and lesbian rights
legislation are made based purely on prejudice, or negative attitudes, that some parts of
society have towards gays and lesbians. The need exists to determine if prejudice is indeed
the driving force behind arguments made against the passage of legislation, since one would
think that arguments based solely on prejudice should not hold any weight in the debate
regarding the passage of legislation. The only evidence that exists to date on the existence of
prejudice in society is from survey data asking individuals their opinions on homosexuality.
However, the examination of results from surveys likely does not provide an accurate picture
regarding prejudice because it is not clear how accurately people respond to survey questions
regarding prejudices they may have.
Another way to examine the existence of prejudice against gays and lesbians is to use a
revealed preferences approach. This approach can be performed by analyzing the effect that
the presence of gay and lesbian households in a neighborhood have on house prices in that
neighborhood. If evidence is found that a higher percentage of gay and lesbian households
in a neighborhood causes a reduction in house prices in that neighborhood, then this can be
taken as evidence of society revealing their preference not to live around gays and lesbians.
This method for analyzing prejudice has been used in a number of previous studies examining
the existence of prejudice against blacks and other racial groups in society (Harris, 1999).
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In the debate over gay and lesbian rights legislation, generally those individuals that are
conservative are the ones most adamant in their opposition to the passage of legislation.
Thus, the existence and the degree of prejudice that exists against gays and lesbians is likely
to vary by neighborhood, depending on the social characteristics of that neighborhood. The
expectation, therefore, is that gay and lesbian households are likelier to have a negative
impact on house prices in a conservative neighborhood than in a liberal one. The possibility
also exists that gay and lesbian households may be an amenity to a neighborhood, especially
in one that is liberal, thereby increasing house prices in that neighborhood. Gay and lesbian
households may be an amenity to a neighborhood as evidence exists that some individuals
in society prefer to live in neighborhoods with more diversity and cultural capital, which gay
and lesbian households likely contribute to (Bell and Binnie, 2004).
This paper estimates a hedonic price model that incorporates the percentage of house-
holds in a neighborhood that are gay or lesbian and an interaction between this variable
and a dummy representing if a neighborhood is conservative. This model is estimated at the
census tract level for the Columbus, OH MSA using the spatial autoregressive model. The
results from this analysis indicate that in liberal neighborhoods a .1% point increase in the
percentage of gay and lesbian households increases house prices by .81%, but in conservative
neighborhoods it decreases house prices by .24%. These results are robust to extension of
the analysis to the Cleveland, OH MSA, and are consistent with the theory that conservative
individuals may hold a prejudice against gays and lesbians.
2 Literature Review
The use of the hedonic price model to value goods that are not explicitly traded in markets
is first developed by Rosen (1974). As applied to housing, the hedonic price model suggests
that the price of a house represents the sum of expenditures on a number of bundled housing
characteristics. These housing characteristics not only include tangible characteristics such
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as the size of the house or the number of bedrooms in the house, but also less tangible neigh-
borhood characteristics such as the quality of the school district or the amount of pollution
where the house is located. The fact that these less tangible neighborhood characteristics
are also capitalized into house prices is formally modeled by Roback (1982).
The theory that a hedonic price model can be used to examine prejudice against a group
is based on the model developed by Yinger (1976), which revises the Bailey (1966) border
model of segregation. The Yinger model is developed in regards to whites and blacks, but is
applicable to the examination of prejudice against gays and lesbians. In the Yinger model,
whites and blacks both receive utility or disutility from living near the other race. This
model departs from the typical border model in that it allows for whites and blacks to care
about the racial composition of where they live. Thus, the model allows for the possibility
of prejudice to be examined. Yinger shows that the coefficient on racial composition in a
regression on value or rent measures the effect of prejudice in this model. In particular, a
negative coefficient on a variable for the percent of neighborhood occupants that is black
means that as this percent increases house prices decrease in the neighborhood, strongly
suggesting the existence of prejudice. Also, Yinger discusses the possibility that the degree
of prejudice, and therefore the magnitude of the coefficient on the racial composition variable,
could vary by neighborhood type. Therefore, interactions for neighborhood type should be
included into the regression analysis also.
A number of studies have been performed using the hedonic price model to examine the
existence of racial prejudice and discrimination. Kiel and Zabel (1996), using data from the
American Housing Survey for Denver, Philadelphia, and Chicago, provides evidence that
prejudice against blacks exists in all three of these cities. They also show that this prejudice
has been increasing overtime in Denver and Philadelphia, while decreasing in Chicago. Myers
(2004) examines discrimination and prejudice also using data from the American Housing
Survey, but uses variables that better control for neighborhood effects. She estimates a he-
donic price model that controls for the race of the household, percent of a neighborhood’s
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population that is black, and interactions between the percentage of a neighborhood that is
black and how racially integrated that neighborhood is. Her main findings are that black
owners pay premiums of around 10% for housing, indicating the existence of housing market
discrimination against blacks. Furthermore, she finds that house values decline in neighbor-
hoods as the percentage of blacks in that neighborhood increase, suggesting the existence of
prejudice against blacks.
The hedonic price model that is developed in this paper is similar to previous models,
with the exception that it takes into consideration the possibility of housing prices exhibiting
spatial dependence. Only recently have hedonic price models begun to incorporate spatial
econometrics into the estimation of the models. Brasington and Hite (2005) uses a spatial
model to analyze the influence that the distance from a census block group to the nearest
pollution site has on the house prices of that census block group. Additionally, Leguizamon
(2010) uses a spatial model of individual housing observations to analyze the effect of the
size of neighboring houses on the price of a house.
3 Data and Methodology
The focus of this paper is on housing transactions that occurred in the Columbus, OH MSA
in the year 2000. The reason for performing the analysis at the MSA level is that previous
studies have suggested the MSA can be considered a segmented housing market. Palmquist
(1984) suggests that no segmentation exists within an MSA, but it does exist between MSAs
due to moving costs. Brasington and Hite (2005) makes the case that moving costs are not
a valid reason for this difference in segmentation because it is likely to be just as costly to
move out to a suburban area within an MSA as it is to move to another MSA. Instead,
they suggest that the assumption of market segmentation between MSAs is valid because of
differing construction costs and job availability. Their reasoning is that it is more difficult
and costly to find a job in a new metro area and move to that area than it is to move or find
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a job in the same metro area.
The data on housing used in this study is from that used in Brasington and Haurin
(2006), Brasington (2007), and Brasington and Hite (2006). The data set is composed of
20,027 observations of of real estate transactions in the year 2000 for the Columbus, OH
MSA. Included in each observation of a housing market transaction are detailed information
on the characteristics of the house being sold and on the neighborhood that the house is
located in. This data set additionally includes data on housing transactions for other MSAs
located in Ohio. The Columbus MSA is used for the focus of this paper because it does not
extend into any other state, therefore full information is available from this data set on it.
It is also used because it is not contiguous to any other MSA, making it a clearly segmented
housing market. As for the other two large MSAs in Ohio, Cincinnati and Cleveland, the
Cincinnati MSA includes part of Kentucky and Indiana and the Cleveland MSA is contiguous
to the Akron MSA.
The unit of observation within the Columbus MSA that is used is the census tract. Each
census tract observation can be thought of as representing an average or representative house
from the census tract. This representative house observation is created by taking the mean
of the price and the other characteristics of the houses that were sold in the census tract. For
the housing characteristics in which taking the mean does not make sense, proportions are
used. The census tract is used as the unit of observation as opposed to individual houses or
a different geography level because the census tract is the smallest geography level in which
the number of gay and lesbian households is available from the Census.
The neighborhood characteristic’s impact on house prices that is of interest in this paper
is the percentage of households in a neighborhood, defined here at the census tract level,
that are gay or lesbian. The data used to calculate the percentage of gay and lesbian
households in each census tract is from the summary files of the 2000 Census. The Census
does not ask individuals directly about their sexual orientation, but beginning with the 1990
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Census it has been possible to identify unmarried gay and lesbian partnered households.1 For
the Columbus MSA, there are a total of 2075 gay households and 2181 lesbian households
identified on the 2000 Census. Thus, approximately one percent of the households in the
Columbus MSA are gay or lesbian households.
One issue that arises with using Census data on same-sex cohabitating couples is whether
or not these couples are indeed gay and lesbian. Black et al. (2000) and Carpenter (2004)
both give an in depth analysis of this issue with both providing evidence that the same-sex
cohabitating couples identified on the Census are likely to be gay and lesbian. Black et al.
(2000) finds that the residence of 60% of partnered gays identified on the 1990 Census are
concentrated in just 20 cities. This finding wouldn’t be expected if those individuals identified
as partnered gays were actually a part of the general non-gay population. They also find that
there is a strong correlation between the concentration of partnered gays in cities and the
concentration of AIDS deaths among young men in those cities. Carpenter (2004) identifies
same-sex cohabitating couples from the Center for Disease Control’s Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS) and shows that these couples are likely to be gay and lesbian
using information on the sexual behavior and family planning of these couples. This finding
provides evidence that in general couples that identify themselves as being same-sex couples
on surveys are indeed gay or lesbian.
Another issue that arises is the possibility that some same-sex cohabitating couples fail
to report themselves as such due possibly to a distrust of government run surveys. This
possibility could make the results of this analysis difficult to interpret if those gay and
lesbian couples that identify themselves as same-sex couples on the Census are different in
someway from those that do not. Black et al. (2000) shows using data from the General Social
Survey (GSS) and the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSS), which are both non-
government run surveys, that in fact the 1990 Census only identifies 35% of the total number
1Gay and lesbian households are identified from the “relationship to household head” heading on the
Census. The categories under this heading are spouse, child, inlaw, unmarried partner, and other non-
relative.
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of partnered gay couples and 29% of the total number of partnered lesbian couples. They
discuss though that empirical findings for characteristics such as veteran status, education,
and earnings for individuals identified as being in same-sex cohabitating couples on the
Census are very similar to those for the same-sex cohabitating couples identified in the GSS
and NHSS. Also, Carpenter (2004) estimates gay and lesbian wage regressions using same-sex
couples from the BRFSS and finds that the results for these wage regressions do not differ
from the results of similar wage regressions using the same-sex couples that are identified on
the Census.
In order to obtain a complete analysis of the effect gay and lesbian households have
on neighborhood house prices, whether or not a neighborhood is conservative needs to be
interacted with the percentage of households that are gay or lesbian. At the census tract
level, there is not an obvious way to control for if a neighborhood is conservative. The
method that is chosen is to create a variable representing whether the census tract is located
in a county that George Bush won in the 2000 Presidential Election. There are eight counties
that are located in the Columbus MSA, with over 60% of the vote going to George Bush in
seven of them. These counties are coded as being conservative, while the eighth county is
coded as being liberal, with 48% of the vote going to George Bush.
The data for the rest of the variables included in the analysis are from either the Brasing-
ton data set or the summary files of the 2000 Census. The representative census tract housing
characteristics that are included are age (in quadratic form), house size (in quadratic form),
lot size (in quadratic form), partial bathrooms, full bathrooms, proportion of houses with air
conditioning, proportion of houses that are one story, proportion of houses with a deck, and
proportion of houses with a garage. In order to control for neighborhood characteristics, the
proportion of households below the poverty line, proportion of individuals with a graduate
degree, median household income, and proportion of individuals that are black are taken
from the Census for each census tract. To further control for neighborhood characteristics,
the 9th grade proficiency rate and mills tax rate for the school district that each house in
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the census tract is located in are averaged and included in the regression analysis. Lastly, in
order to control for access to amenities, the distance from the center of each census tract to
the Columbus CBD is calculated from the Census Tiger Ohio census tract shapefile.
The typical hedonic price model regresses the price of a house on the characteristics of
that house and the neighborhood the house is located in using OLS. However, the coefficients
from the OLS estimation of the hedonic price model are likely to be biased. The reason for
this bias is that the prices of houses located near each other are likely dependent on each
other because people should be willing to pay more for a house located in proximity to
houses of higher value. This spatial dependence in housing prices necessitates the inclusion
of the average of the prices of proximate houses as an independent variable. Thus, to
control for this spatial dependence, the house price dependent variable vector is multiplied
by a weight matrix representing the spatial relationship in prices. The weight matrix is
typically constructed as an n × n standardized matrix representing a nearest neighbor or
contiguity relationship between observations. Since the observations in this analysis are for
a geographical unit, the census tract, the weight matrix is constructed as a contiguity matrix.
This matrix is constructed by placing a one in the matrix if two census tracts share a border
with each other and then dividing across each row by the number of non-zero elements in
that row.
This model is known as the spatial autoregressive hedonic price model and is the one used
here to estimate the impact of gay and lesbian households on neighborhood house prices.
The model takes the form:
vi = α + ρWvi + βdDi + βhXhi + βnXni + i, where  is N(0, σ
2Ii),
in which subscript i indicates the census tract, v represents the logged mean census tract
house price, Xh is a matrix of the mean or proportion of housing characteristics in the census
tract, Xn is a matrix of neighborhood characteristics of the census tract, D is the distance
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from the center of the census tract to the Columbus CBD, and W is an n×n spatial weight
matrix representing the contiguity relationship between the census tracts within the MSA.2
Included in Xn, is the variable for the percentage of gay and lesbian households in the
census tract, and a variable representing the interaction between this variable and a dummy
equaling one if the census tract is in a county George Bush won in 2000.
Previous literature applying spatial econometrics to hedonic price models has used the
spatial Durbin model, as opposed to the spatial autoregressive model. The spatial Durbin
model includes not only a spatial lag of the dependent variable, but also spatial lags of
the independent variables of the model. The choice to use the spatial autoregressive model
instead of the spatial Durbin model is made because the housing observations used here are
being averaged at the census tract level. This larger size of the geographical unit makes it
less likely that a change in the independent variable of an observation has a direct impact
on the dependent variable of another observation. Using Bayesian estimation of the spatial
autoregressive and spatial Durbin models, it is possible to calculate model probabilities for
the true model. Performing the estimation of these two models and calculating the model
probabilities indicates that the spatial autoregressive model is indeed the true model.
The use of a spatial model allows direct, indirect, and total effects for each of the in-
dependent variables to be calculated. The direct effect represents the average effect that a
change in the independent variable of an observation has on it’s own dependent variable.
This coefficient includes the initial impact of the change in an independent variable on it’s
dependent variable as well as feedback in the system. This feedback occurs when the change
in the dependent variable causes changes in the other dependent variables of the system
through the spatial weight matrix that in turn feedback onto the initial dependent variable.
The indirect effect represents the average spatial spill over effect that a change in an inde-
pendent variable has on all other dependent variables, excluding it’s own. The total effect
2For the creation of the weight matrix W, the Ohio census tract shapefile is obtained from the Census Tiger
website and centroid x,y coordinates for each census tract within the MSA are calculated using GeoDa. These
centroid coordinates are then used to calculate the contiguity weight matrix W in Matlab using LeSage’s
Spatial Econometrics Toolbox.
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is the sum of the direct and indirect effects. The results for the direct effects are the main
focus of this paper due to the interest in prejudice against gays and lesbians.
4 Results
The results for the estimation of the spatial autoregressive hedonic price model for the
Columbus MSA are provided in column 1 of table 4.3. The estimate for the coefficient
on the spatial weight matrix ρ is positive and statistically significant. This result provides
evidence that observations on house prices are spatially dependent. Thus, a model controlling
for spatial dependence is superior to one that does not.
Another coefficient of particular interest is the one on the distance to the CBD variable.
Gays and lesbians are usually thought of as locating in high amenity areas, so it is necessary
to adequately control for access to amenities in the analysis. This coefficient is negative and
statistically significant, as is expected if the distance to CBD controls for access to amenities
or jobs located in the CBD. The magnitude of this coefficient indicates that a one mile
increase in the distance from the CBD reduces house prices by .37%.
The results for the coefficients on the rest of the housing and neighborhood characteristics
are generally as expected. An increase in the number of partial and full bathrooms, size of
the house, and lot size of the house leads to an increase in the price of the house, as does a
decrease in the age of the house. Additionally, having a deck, air conditioning, and being one
story result in an increase in the price of the house. As for the neighborhood characteristics,
an increase in median family income and the proportion of individuals with a graduate degree
increases the price of the house, while an increase in the percentage of individuals that are
black decreases the price of the house.
The estimated coefficient on the percentage of gay and lesbian households variable, and on
the interaction term between this variable and whether a census tract is conservative or not,
provide evidence that gay and lesbian households may serve as an amenity in liberal neigh-
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borhoods, but prejudice may exist against these households in conservative neighborhoods.
In particular, a .1% point increase in the percentage of households in a liberal neighborhood
that are gay or lesbian leads to a .81% increase in the price of a house. On the other hand, a
.1% increase in the percentage of households in a conservative neighborhood that are gay or
lesbian results in a .24% decrease in the price of a house. These results confirm the prediction
of the Yinger model that the coefficient representing prejudice is dependent on the make up
of the neighborhood under consideration.
The focus up to this point has been on the Columbus MSA. As a robustness check of the
Columbus results, the same model is run for the Cleveland MSA. This MSA is contiguous
to the Akron MSA, so it is not clear if it can be considered a segmented housing market.
However, results from this re-estimation can be useful for comparison to the Columbus
MSA results. In Cleveland there are five counties, with three of these counties won by
George Bush in the 2000 Presidential Election. Thus, these three counties are coded as
being conservative for the interaction between percentage of gay and lesbian households and
whether a neighborhood is conservative.
The results from this re-estimation for the Cleveland sample are provided in column 2
of table 4.3. The coefficient on the percentage of gay and lesbian households variable is
positive and statistically significant, as in the Columbus sample. This coefficient indicates
that a .1% point increase in the percentage of gay and lesbian households increases the price
of a house by .44%. The results also show that the interaction term between the percentage
of households that are gay or lesbian and the conservative variable is positive and statistically
insignificant for the Cleveland MSA. This result suggests that prejudice does not exist among
conservative neighborhoods in the Cleveland MSA like it does in the Columbus MSA. An
explanation for this difference may be that the culture significantly differs between these
two MSAs. For instance, those that vote for conservative candidates may be more socially
conservative in Columbus than in Cleveland.
Another explanation has to do with the distribution of conservatives in the Cleveland
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MSA. In the Columbus MSA, there are four counties that all voted over 60% for George
Bush, with one county voting under 50%. Therefore, a single dummy variable is appropriate
for controlling for conservativeness in Columbus. On the other hand, in Cleveland, the vote
for George Bush is much more spread out. He received 34% of the vote in Cuyahoga County,
43% in Lorain County, 50% in Lake County, 56% in Medina County, and 60% in Geauga
County. Due to this variance in the vote, a single dummy variable may not be appropriate
for controlling for conservative neighborhoods in the Cleveland MSA. A better approach may
be to include a dummy variable and interaction term for each county, and comparing the
estimated interaction terms to the Bush vote of each county.
This re-estimation is performed and the results are reported in column 3 of table 4.3. In
this re-estimation the Cuyahoga County dummy term is omitted, meaning that the observed
interaction coefficients are relative to the most liberal county in the MSA. The coefficient for
the percentage of gay and lesbian households variable indicates that a one percentage point
increase in the percentage of gay and lesbian households leads to a statistically significant
.41% increase in the price of a house in Cuyahoga County. Turning to the county and
percentage of households that are gay and lesbian interaction terms, the only one that is
statistically significant is the Geauga County interaction. This coefficient indicates that a
one percentage point increase in the percentage of gay and lesbian households reduces the
price of a house in Geauga County by 2.79%, providing evidence consistent with the theory
that discrimination against gays and lesbians does exist in this county.
The results from the Cleveland regression suggest that there is a threshold, at least in
relation to votes for conservative candidates, for prejudice to show up in house prices. This
threshold appears to be around 60%, as prejudice did not show up in the results for Medina
County, in which George Bush received 56% of the vote. This result matches with the
results from the Columbus MSA in which all the neighborhoods labeled as conservative, and
in which evidence of prejudice is found, had over 60% of the vote go to George Bush. The
likely reason for this threshold is that counties with less than this amount of conservative
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vote may not have truly socially conservative attitudes, as not everyone that voted for George
Bush holds these attitudes.
The negative impact that gays and lesbians have on house prices in conservative Cleveland
neighborhoods appears to be much larger than it is in conservative Columbus neighborhoods.
The likely reason for this result is the difference in degree of liberalness of the liberal neigh-
borhoods in the two MSAs. In Cleveland, the Geauga County coefficient is relative to the
omitted Cuyahoga County variable, and Cuyahoga County is strongly liberal as only 34% of
the 2000 vote went to George Bush. On the other hand, the coefficient for the conservative
counties of Columbus are relative to Franklin County, in which George Bush still received
48% of the vote.
A possible issue with the results that have been reported up to this point is that the
percentage of households in a census tract that are gay or lesbian may not be exogenous. If
prejudice exists against gays and lesbians in conservative neighborhoods, then there is the
chance that gays and lesbians are discriminated against in the housing market in those neigh-
borhoods. The presence of discrimination then leads to less gays and lesbians locating in
that neighborhood than the amount that otherwise would. In order to analyze the possibility
that discrimination exists, data is needed on the sexual orientation of the household that is
purchasing the house. Unfortunately, characteristics of the individuals purchasing the houses
is unavailable in the housing data set used in this paper. If discrimination does exist in con-
servative and not liberal neighborhoods, then this discrimination would bias the coefficients
reported here in the direction of not finding prejudice in conservative neighborhoods. Since
the results reported for the Columbus and Cleveland MSAs indicate that prejudice does exist
in conservative neighborhoods, the existence of discrimination would only strengthen these
results.
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5 Conclusion
This chapter builds on studies from the hedonic price model literature on prejudice against
blacks to analyze the existence of prejudice against gays and lesbians. The results indicate
that in the Columbus MSA the price of a house increases in liberal neighborhoods by .81%
and falls in conservative neighborhoods by .24% in response to a .1% point increase in the
percentage of gay and lesbian households in that neighborhood. For the Cleveland MSA,
the results show that a .1% point increase in the percentage of gay and lesbian households
increases house prices by .41% in all neighborhoods except the most conservative ones, in
which house prices fall by 2.79%. These results are taken as being consistent with the
theory that gay and lesbian households have an amenity effect in liberal neighborhoods and
a disamenity effect, likely due to prejudice, in conservative neighborhoods.
These results have important policy implications related to the passage of gay and lesbian
rights legislation. If conservative individuals are indeed prejudice against gays and lesbians,
then this prejudice is likely to be playing a role in their voting on gay and lesbian rights
issues. This is a problem since it seems unfair to leave such issues up to a popular vote
when prejudice is having an effect on the outcome of the vote. Also, the possible existence
of prejudice indicates that politicians and gay and lesbian rights groups may want to devote
more resources in attempting to reduce this prejudice in society.
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Table 4.1: Definition and Source of Variables
Variable Definition Source
CBD Distance distance from center Author’s Calculation
of census tract to CBD (in miles)
Age mean age of houses within Brasington Data Set
census tract (in hundreds years)
Lot Size mean lot size of houses within Brasington Data Set
census tract (in ten thousands of square feet)
House Size mean house size of houses within Brasington Data Set
census tract (in thousands of square feet)
Air Conditioning proportion of houses within Brasington Data Set
census tract with central air conditioning
Deck proportion of houses within Brasington Data Set
census tract with a deck
Garage proportion of houses within Brasington Data Set
census tract with a garage
One Story proportion of houses within Brasington Data Set
census tract that are one story
Full Baths mean number of full baths for Brasington Data Set
houses in the census tract
Partial Baths mean number of partial baths for Brasington Data Set
houses in the census tract
Tax Rate mean tax year 2000 class 1 tax rate Brasington Data Set
faced by houses within census tract
School Quality mean pass rate on 9th grade prof. test Brasington Data Set
faced by houses within census tract
Income mean income per person in the 2000 Census Summary File
census tract
Grad Degree proportion of census tract population 2000 Census Summary File
that has a graduate degree
Poverty proportion of households in census 2000 Census Summary File
tract that fall below the poverty line
Black proportion of census tract population 2000 Census Summary File
that is black
Gay/Lesbian proportion of households in census 2000 Census Summary File
tract that are gay or lesbian
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Columbus Cleveland
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log Price 11.716 0.444 11.661 0.494
One Story 0.398 0.274 0.257 0.269
Garage 0.591 0.352 0.743 0.346
Air Conditioner 0.521 0.387 0.178 0.247
Deck 0.040 0.099 0.134 0.168
Full Bath 1.498 0.360 1.332 0.391
Partial Bath 0.491 0.269 0.402 0.318
Age 0.429 0.279 0.566 0.262
House Size 1.664 0.391 1.670 0.478
Lot Size 2.148 3.037 2.263 4.160
School Quality 58.512 19.267 54.230 25.266
Tax Rate 32.338 5.465 33.448 8.095
Pollution 2.090 14.217 0.819 15.073
CBD Distance 11.757 9.342 12.565 8.936
Poverty 0.107 0.102 0.122 0.121
Grad Degree 0.092 0.087 0.081 0.085
Black 0.156 0.239 0.237 0.342
Gay/Lesbian 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004
Income 2.271 0.916 2.193 1.140
Age Sq 0.262 0.312 0.390 0.333
House Size Sq 2.922 1.509 3.017 2.337
Lot Size Sq 13.836 46.877 22.400 145.016
Observations 367 653
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Table 4.3: Spatial Autoregressive Hedonic Price Model Results for Cleveland and Columbus MSAs (Dependent
Variable is the Natural Log of House Price)
Columbus Cleveland Cleveland
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat Coefficient T-stat
CBD Distance -0.0037 -2.23** -0.0027 -3.09*** -0.0051 -4.55***
Age -0.4554 -3.56*** 0.1599 1.30 0.1746 1.56
Age Sq 0.3281 2.99*** -0.4390 -4.72*** -0.4001 -4.71***
House Size 0.7823 4.81*** 0.4321 8.03*** 0.3641 6.42***
House Size Sq -0.1110 -2.87*** -0.0107 -1.25 -0.0047 -0.44
Lot Size 0.0256 3.68*** 0.0059 2.14** 0.0104 3.63***
Lot Size Sq -0.0009 -2.35** 0.0000 -0.32 -0.0001 -1.43
Partial Bath 0.1652 2.85*** 0.1012 3.21*** 0.1028 3.32***
Full Bath 0.1159 2.27** 0.0137 0.37 0.0284 0.84
Deck 0.1736 1.92* 0.1485 2.97*** 0.2232 4.48***
Garage -0.0412 -0.98 0.0190 0.66 0.1733 4.45***
One Story 0.1365 3.92*** 0.0435 1.56 -0.0016 -0.05
Air Conditioner 0.1095 2.22** -0.0931 -3.09*** -0.0125 -0.31
Income 0.0736 3.49*** 0.0414 4.55*** 0.0423 4.63***
Grad Degree 1.0870 6.85*** 0.5753 4.40*** 0.5756 4.43***
School Quality 0.0009 1.26 0.0026 6.11*** 0.0026 6.51***
Tax Rate 0.0018 0.90 -0.0018 -2.37** -0.0020 -2.51**
Poverty -0.0373 -0.30 -0.2156 -2.14** -0.1578 -1.81*
Pollution 0.0004 1.12 0.0006 1.90* 0.0006 1.81*
Black -0.1619 -4.51*** -0.1096 -5.24*** -0.0978 -4.67***
Gay/Lesbian 8.0524 4.61*** 4.3508 2.31** 4.0251 2.32**
Gay/Lesbian*Conservative -10.4204 -2.00** 0.2967 0.07
Conservative 0.1777 2.83*** -0.0074 -0.30
Gay/Lesbian*Geauaga -31.5364 -1.68*
Gay/Lesbian*Lake -0.0752 -0.02
Gay/Lesbian*Lorain 3.8992 0.56
Gay/Lesbian*Medina -9.4998 -0.74
Geauaga 0.1283 1.79*
Lake 0.2497 5.06***
Lorain 0.1408 3.46***
Medina 0.0801 1.59
rho 0.1072 0.1569 0.1576
r squared 0.92 0.93 0.94
observations 367 653 653
a Statistical significance is reported at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
b The Gay/Lesbian, Black, Poverty, and Grad Degree neighborhood characteristics enter the regression as
proportions. Therefore, the coefficients reported in the table for these variables indicate the percent change
in house prices resulting from a one percentage point increase in the variable.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The three essays of this dissertation provide empirical evidence that informs the debate
over the passage of gay and lesbian rights legislation. Chapter 2 provides evidence that the
passage of a sexual orientation private employment anti-discrimination law does not have
the effect that it is intended to have by its passage. The passage of this law has no impact
on the employment outcomes for lesbians, while it has a mixed impact on these outcomes
for gays. Specifically, gays realize hire relative earnings but less of a relative probability of
finding employment as a result of the passage of this law. The higher earnings are received
by younger gays and the lower chance of finding employment is a result only experienced by
older gays. These findings indicate that resources used by gay and lesbian rights groups, as
well as politicians, in attempting to get a sexual orientation anti-discrimination law passed
can likely be put to use in other ways that have more of a positive impact on the lives of
gays and lesbians.
Chapter 2 only focuses on the passage of eight private employment anti-discrimination
laws due to only having the 1990 and 2000 Census data to work with. Since 1998, ten more
states have passed the private employment anti-discrimination law. With the release of more
recent data on gays and lesbians the analysis performed in Chapter 2 can be extended to
look at the impact of the passage of this recent legislation, and how the impact of this law
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has changed overtime. Also for future research, the development of a theory is necessary
towards why the labor market outcomes of different groups of individuals, such as blacks,
women, the disabled, gays, lesbians, and different gay age groups, are impacted differently
by anti-discrimination legislation.
Chapter 3 indicates that gays and lesbians do have preferences for particular types of gay
and lesbian rights legislation. It is found that these individuals prefer to live in states with
hate crime and public employment anti-discrimination laws, and that they may prefer to
not live in states with private employment anti-discrimination laws. Therefore, the evidence
from chapter 3 suggests that the recently passed federal sexual orientation hate crime law
has increased the utility of gays and lesbians. What it also suggests is that the passage of
the federal private employment anti-discrimination law that is currently a proposed bill in
Congress could possibly reduce the utility of gays and lesbians. Additionally, these revealed
preference findings show that gays and lesbians are likely to benefit from the passage of a
public employment anti-discrimination law at the state or federal level of government.
As for future research, recent data on gay and lesbian migration can be used to analyze
how the passage of the legislation analyzed in chapter 3, as well as the passage of recently
passed same sex marriage and union laws, have hurt or benefited gays and lesbians. Extend-
ing the analysis to these recently passed relationship laws would be particularly important
for an analysis of how state and local areas can attract gays and lesbians into their regions.
This is because only a few states have passed these laws, so large gains of gays and lesbians
could possibly be had with the passage of this relationship legislation. Also, it appears that
a federal law allowing for gays and lesbians to enter into unions or marriage is a long way off.
Therefore, the passage of this legislation at the state and local level is likely to have a long
term impact on the gay and lesbian population of the region. Lastly, as with any migration
model of public policies, endogeneity of gay and lesbian rights legislation is a possibility in
the model presented in chapter 3. With more gay and lesbian migration data over time,
difference-in-difference approaches using panel data can be used to analyze the possibility
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and impact of this endogenity in the context of gay and lesbian rights legislation.
Chapter 4 provides results that are consistent with the theory that prejudice exists against
gay and lesbian households in conservative neighborhoods, and that these households are
actually an amenity to liberal neighborhoods. This finding suggests that arguments and
votes made against the passage of gay and lesbian rights legislation may be the result of
prejudice that is held by individuals, rather than an honest analysis of the costs and benefits
of the legislation. This finding is important because the rejection of any type of legislation
should not be the result of hidden prejudice on the part of voters or politicians. The policy
implications of this finding are unclear because it is hard, if not impossible, to change
prejudice that is held by individuals in society and in policy making roles in the government.
It is necessary though to consider that prejudice may be behind negative claims being made
regarding the passage of gay and lesbian rights legislation in order to fully understand these
claims.
Future research extensions for chapter 4 are numerous. For one, it is necessary to come up
with a more precise and localized measure of the social conservativeness of a neighborhood.
The George Bush vote proxy used in chapter 4 is the best one available based on the sample
data, but using a county measure such as this is far from perfect. Additionally, it should
be kept in mind that this analysis is based on data from two MSAs in the same state, and
on a single data set. It would be beneficial to run a similar analysis as in chapter 4 using a
different data set of housing prices covering different areas of the country. Also, the creation
of a data set on housing purchases that includes the sexual orientation of the households
involved in the transactions is of great importance, as this would allow an analysis of if
prejudice results in housing market discrimination against gays and lesbians.
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